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I. INTRODUCTION
In International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,'
the Supreme Court held that an employer violated Title VII's2
ban on sex discrimination by excluding all women who could
not prove their sterility from production jobs in a lead-battery
factory.' In sweeping language, the Court indicated that a
policy directed only at fertile women is overt discrimination on
the basis of sex regardless of the scientific evidence of
heightened safety concerns for mothers or potential mothers.4
The Court then held that the statutory defense for overt
discrimination, the bona fide occupational qualification,5 was
not available to Johnson Controls because there was no
evidence that employing women might cause financial ruin.'
Thus, the Court held for the plaintiffs: Johnson Controls' policy
was impermissible discrimination on the basis of sex and a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 In
reaching this decision, the conservative Supreme Court took a
position to the left of that taken by the three lower federal
appellate courts to consider policies excluding all fertile women
from hazardous jobs.8
The case raises a number of questions, beginning with the
obvious one of why so conservative a Court would reach so
liberal a decision (and one opposed by employers) in so con-
troversial an area. Another question is whether the Court
would similarly hold inconsistent with Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination an employer policy offering pregnant workers or,
perhaps all workers trying to become parents, special risk-
minimizing options? Also, how would the Court regard a policy
1. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000 e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
4. Id at 197-200.
5. Under Title VII, the BFOQ defense is limited to situations in which discrim-
ination is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.
Id at 201.
6. Id. at 206.
7. Id. at 200.
8. The lower federal appellate courts found the disparate impact/business ne-
cessity theory, which imposes a less stringent burden on an employer, applicable in
fetal protection policy cases. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
886 F.2d 871, 883 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Hayes v.
Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp.,
697 F.2d 1172, 1185 (4th Cir. 1982); refer to notes 29-41 infra and accompanying
text.
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of firing or limiting the employment of pregnant women?
Often it is the worker, who is either pregnant or wishes to
become a parent in the immediate future, who desires some
sort of accommodation of fetal risk by the employer, perhaps in
the form of a temporary transfer to a low-lead area or some
other accommodation during a period of heightened risk. Is
there anything in current anti-discrimination law, including
the Americans with Disabilities Act,9 or the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993,0 that would support an employee's
claim to reasonable accommodation?
The Johnson Controls decision also raises several
questions from the perspective of employers. What is the
possible scope of employer liability in tort given the obligation
not to discriminate on the basis of sex even when female and
male employees vary with respect to fetal risk? What measures
should be considered to protect employers, and perhaps
workers as well, if ruinous tort liability does become a
palpable risk, particularly if it is linked to maternal
employment more than to paternal employment?
This Article examines the Johnson Controls decision to
understand why the Court reached its decision and explores
these questions. Part II discusses the relevant cases and policy
analysis, including the Title VII cases prior to Johnson
Controls, the policy issues raised by these cases, and briefly
examines the Johnson Controls decision. Part III discusses
what sorts of distinctions employers should be able to make
between employees in terms of reproductive hazards without
violating Title VII and Johnson Controls. Part IV discusses the
problems that remain from the perspective of both employers
and employees.
II. CASELAW AND POLICY
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls,
five federal courts of appeals considered the legality of fetal
vulnerability policies." Two of the policies at issue required
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991).
10. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(1993) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. 88 2601, 2611-19, 2631-36, 2651-54; 5 U.S.C. 88
2105, 6381-87) [hereinafter FMLA].
11. See Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303, 1311 (6th Cir. 1990)
(finding that the fetal protection policy was discriminatory and could only be justi-
fied by a BFOQ defense); Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 901 (holding that Johnson
Controls had both a business necessity defense and a BFOQ defense by demonstrat-
ing that its job exclusion policy was reasonably necessary for safety); Hayes, 726
F.2d at 1554 (holding that the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of facial
1994]
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pregnant workers to be fired in order to protect the health of
their unborn children. 12 The other three policies were similar
to (and included) that at issue in Johnson Controls: certain
hazardous jobs were closed to all women who could not show
sterility.
13
A. Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals
In the two cases in which hospitals fired pregnant X-ray
technicians, the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits ruled in the technicians' favor.'4 In the Fifth Circuit
case, the court emphasized that less restrictive alternatives
were available, for example, the temporary transfer of the
pregnant X-ray technicians to less hazardous positions, and
concluded that the discharge policy impermissibly violated Title
VII.' 5 In the Eleventh Circuit case, the court would have
allowed the discharge policy if the employer had shown that
pregnant workers' employment opportunities were limited only
when risks to the fetus were unreasonable.' Because the
hospital's policy tolerated no risk at all for pregnant workers,
the court regarded it as unreasonable and not permissible un-
der Title VII.'7 In addition, the court regarded the employer's
failure to explore less drastic alternatives, such as rearranging
the plaintiff's duties so as to minimize her exposure to
radiation, as precluding a successful defense to the plaintiff's
discrimination claim.'
8
In the three cases in which employers closed certain jobs
discrimination that arose when it fired the plaintiff upon learning of her pregnancy);
Wright, 697 F.2d at 1189-90 (holding that an employer may use a business necessity
defense when restricting job access to protect the health of female employees' unborn
children); Zuniqa v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992-94 (5th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the defendant hospital's business necessity defense was actually a pre-
text for discrimination because it failed to utilize less discriminatory alternative
methods for achieving its business purpose).
12. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1546 (concerning hospital's policy of fniing pregnant
X-ray technicians); Zuniqa, 692 F.2d at 989 (same).
13. See Grant, 908 F.2d at 1304 (analyzing General Motors' "fetal protection"
policy which excluded all fertile women from foundry jobs involving exposure to air-
borne lead); Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 876 (ruling on a fetal protection policy
excluding all fertile women from high lead exposure positions in the employer's bat-
tery manufacturing division); Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182 (discussing Olin's "female
employment and fetal vulnerability" program that excluded women from jobs having
exposure to known or suspected abortifacient or teratogenic chemicals).
14. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1541; Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 994.
15. Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 992-94 (noting that applicable law did not include the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978).
16. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1550-51.
17. Id
18. Id- at 1553-54.
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to all women who could not show sterility, the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits indicated that although the records before them
could not support the policies, reasonable policies applying to
all fertile women would be allowed. 9 In the Seventh Circuit's
Johnson Controls decision, the majority of the en banc court
upheld the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the
employer, holding that the policy excluding all fertile women
from production jobs did not violate Title VII.20
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
interpreted by the Court and amended by Congress, there are
two major ways to analyze employment discrimination cases:
disparate treatment and disparate impact.2' The crux of a
disparate treatment sex discrimination case is the allegation
that the employer treated the plaintiff differently because she
was a woman.2 2  Such discrimination is proscribed by the
plain language of Title VII, which forbids differential
treatment of employees as to terms and conditions of employ-
ment "because ... of sex."' There is one defense to such an
allegation (if found to be true by the fact finder): the statutory
BFOQ defense, which courts construe fairly narrowly.'
The crux of a disparate impact case is the allegation that
an employer rule or practice, though neutral on its face, has a
disparate impact on women, i.e., depresses or limits in some
19. See Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303, 1311 (6th Cir. 1990)
(finding job exclusion policies permissible upon a showing of a factual basis for be-
lieving women workers cannot perform safely and efficiently); Wright v. Olin Corp.,
697 F.2d 1172, 1189-90 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating that reasonable workplace re-
strictions may be placed upon women workers to protect their unborn children).
20. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 901 (7th
Cir. 1989) (en banc), reu'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
21. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(stating that a prima facie case of disparate treatment is shown when a member of
a category protected by Title VII is qualified and applies for a job but is rejected for
reasons giving rise to an inference of discrimination); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (finding that disparate treatment is shown where
(a) the applicant belongs to a racial minority group; (b) the applicant was qualified
for the job; (c) the applicant was rejected; and (d) the employer continued to look for
applicants with the rejected applicant's qualifications); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that the disparate impact theory of Title VII prohi-
bitions includes employment practices that are facially neutral but discriminate in
their disproportionately negative effect on protected minorities).
22. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547 (describing the disparate treatment method of
proving discrimination under Title VII when an employer facially discriminates be-
tween employees by categories of race, religion, national origin, and gender).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
24. Id. § 2 000e-2(e); refer to note 5 supra.
25. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34 (1977) (noting that the
BFOQ defense "provides only the narrowest of exceptions" to Title VII's rule that
employers provide equal employment opportunities).
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way women's employment opportunities relative to men's.
Although Title VII's original statutory language did not plainly
include such claims, Congress has since codified a 1971
Supreme Court case recognizing the disparate impact method
of proving discrimination.' The defense to such an action is
the somewhat looser business necessity defense.'
These two modes of analysis were available when the
Courts of Appeals considered the legality of fetal protection
policies under Title VII.2 The disparate treatment inquiry
seeks to determine whether an employer actually treated
women and men differently.' If so, then the employer will
have violated Title VII absent a finding that the sex is a
BFOQ for the job in question, a rather narrow exception.3 '
The disparate impact inquiry seeks to determine whether a job
requirement is linked closely enough to legitimate business
26. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 (finding disparate impact in violation of Title
VII when an employer's standardized tests resulted in a disproportionate ratio of
blacks being excluded from desirable jobs); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-31 (applying
the disparate impact analysis developed in Griggs to find that Alabama's statutory
height and weight requirements for prison guards disparately affected women in
violation of Title VII).
27. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 (finding that Title VII prohibits both overt
discrimination and employment practices having a discriminatory impact) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. III 1991)).
28. See id. at 431; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1991). In Griggs,
the Court stated that an employment practice that discriminates against a Title VII
protected class is prohibited if it cannot be shown to be related to job performance.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
The Johnson Court required a showing of the employer's potential financial
ruin for Johnson Controls to successfully invoke the BFOQ defense. See International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991). In comparison, the
business necessity defense requires only a showing that the discriminating employ-
ment practice is related to employee job performance. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
29. See Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303, 1310 (6th Cir. 1990)
(analyzing the fetal protection policy exclusively under the disparate treatment model
for overt discrimination); International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886
F.2d 871, 886 (7th Cir. 1989) (following the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits in adopt-
ing a disparate impact analysis), reu'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Hayes v. Shelby Memo-
rial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984) (utilizing both the disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1185
(4th Cir. 1982) (finding the disparate treatment model wholly inappropriate for ana-
lyzing a fetal vulnerability policy and adopting the disparate impact analysis);
Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 989-90 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that
the plaintiff established a prima facie disparate impact case, thus shifting the bur-
den to the employer to show that business necessity justified its action).
30. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198 (noting that Johnson Controls'
policy was not neutral because it did not apply to male reproductive capacity in the
same manner as to that of females).
31. See id. at 200 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988)) (stating that an em-
ployer may rebut a claim of facial sex discrimination if sex falls within the restric-
tive scope of a BFOQ reasonably necessary to normal operation of its business); refer
to notes 24-25 infra.
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needs, broadly understood, to justify its use despite its
disparate impact on a group protected under Title VII
Although the disparate treatment model would seem the
appropriate framework for analyzing an employment policy
applying on its face only to women, the courts that have con-
sidered fetal protection policies used both disparate treatment
and disparate impact models.' Four of the five courts used
disparate impact, often with tortured explanations of why this
was the appropriate mode of analysis.' It is possible to
analyze a policy applying only to fertile or pregnant women as
discriminating on the basis of something other than sex, so
that the disparate impact model is appropriate. Such a policy
discriminates on the basis of pregnancy or the ability to be-
come pregnant, rather than sex. Thus the policy discriminates
not between women and men but between people able to
become pregnant or actually pregnant (some women) and other
people (other women and men). Indeed, this approach was
taken by the Supreme Court in the 1976 case of General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert.' In that case, the Court held that an
employer's decision not to afford disability protection for
pregnancy-related disabilities was not sex discrimination
because it was based on an underlying factor independent of
sex: the cost of covering pregnancy-related disabilities. 6 But
32. See Wright, 697 F.2d at 1188 (posing the question whether an employment
policy of job exclusion, justified as necessary to protect unborn fetuses, is a business
necessity despite the policy's disproportionate adverse impact on women employees);
Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 991-92 (determining that the business necessity requires an
inquiry into whether an overriding, legitimate business purpose for a sex or preg-
nancy-related categorization is necessary for safe and effective business operations).
33. Refer to note 21 supra.
34. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 883-84 (citing Wright, 697 F.2d at 1185 &
n.2) (rationalizing that even though the employer's fetal protection policy was not
facially neutral, the underlying similarities between disparate impact cases and the
plaintiff's challenge to Johnson Controls' policy required analysis under the disparate
impact/business necessity model); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543,
1552 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an employer can show that its scientifically-based
job termination for pregnancy policy is "neutral" in that the policy "equally protects
the offspring of all employees"); Wright, 697 F.2d at 1185 & n.21 (referring to the
BFOQ defense as merely a paradigmatic defense in disparate treatment cases involv-
ing overt discrimination, but opining that an employer is not limited to this sole
business necessity defense because, in the court's view, nothing in Title VII makes
the BFOQ defense exclusive); Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 990-92 (proceeding directly to the
employer's business necessity defense for discharging pregnant X-ray technicians
without discussion of the higher BFOQ defense standard and without clarifying
whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie disparate treatment or disparate
impact case). Only the Sixth Circuit relies exclusively on the disparate treatment
model. See Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303, 1310 (6th Cir. 1990).
35. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
36. Id at 133-35 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494, 496 n.20
(1974)).
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Congress overruled Gilbert with the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978 (PDA), which provides that sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII includes distinctions based on preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.3 7
Given that the PDA extends Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy and related medical conditions such as fertility, the
appellate decisions using disparate impact as the only or
primary mode of analysis read like something out of Alice in
Wonderland.' Consider, for example, the "reasoning" of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in explaining why it would
use the disparate impact model to analyze a policy which by
its terms, and as quoted by the court, dealt with "'female em-
ployment and fetal vulnerability. ' "39 The court described the
policy as "literally expressed in gender neutral terms," and
thus one for which the disparate impact analysis was
appropriate.' The court did admit that the policy's neutrality
"might be subject to logical dispute," but regarded the dispute
as "mere semantic quibbling."4
These decisions can only be understood as reflecting a
deep-seated need to "protect" women and children when
"reasonable" regardless of the relevant law. The law aside, this
goal might seem understandable. Surely "reasonable"
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) [hereinafter PDA]. According to both Senate and
House reports, Congress considered the approach in Gilbert inconsistent with a prop-
er understanding of Title VII's anti-discrimination mandate. See S. REP. No. 331,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977) (commenting that the PDA made express the
"commonsense' view that sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII includes discrim-
ination on the basis of pregnancy, rejecting Gilbert), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4749, 4749-51; H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978) (noting that the
PDA's purpose was to reverse the outcome in Gilbert, so that employers could not
discriminate between pregnancy and related medical conditions and other disabilities
with respect to benefits), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753.
38. LEwis CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Donald J. Gray, ed. 1971). The
disparate impact approach is an odd post-PDA strategy for courts to follow when
analyzing employment practices that overtly categorize employees on the basis of
their fertility, ability to bear a child, or the lack thereof, because the PDA clarified
that fertility-based distinctions are intentional policies of sex discrimination. Refer to
note 37 supra and accompanying text. Intentional discrimination, of course, should
be analyzed under the McDonnell DouglaslBurdine disparate treatment model. Refer
to note 21 supra. The use of the disparate impact model is somewhat more under-
standable in cases that arose prior to the effective date of the PDA. See, e.g., Wright
v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1178 (4th Cir. 1982) (concerning a sex discrimination
complaint filed with the EEOC in July 1976, before the PDA's effective date); Zuniga
v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 989 n.6 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that the
facts occurred prior to the PDA taking effect).
39. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182.
40. Id. at 1186.
41. Id.
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restrictions on maternal employment are appropriate in some
circumstances. There are, after all, many jobs in the American
economy. Why should fertile or pregnant women work at those
that are particularly hazardous to the well-being of their
unborn or unconceived children?
B. Policy Analysis
Close analysis of the policy issue reveals a much more
complicated reality. We cannot effectively "protect" children by
limiting the employment opportunities of women. Indeed, such
policies are likely often to hurt children. I make two major
points in this discussion. First, the scientific evidence of risks
associated with maternal and paternal occupational exposure
does not support fetal protection policies which exclude only
women from jobs posing reproductive hazards. Second, given
working women's roles as economic actors, the pattern of
"protection" adopted by companies causes greater harm to the
children of working women than such policies avoid.
1. The Scientific Evidence. The available scientific
evidence provides no basis for protecting the well-being of the
next generation by limiting the employment opportunities of
women only.42 We actually know relatively little about risks
associated with occupational exposure at current levels to
various reproductive hazards." Much of the evidence used in
formulating fetal protection policies was compiled when women
workers were exposed to far higher levels of workplace toxins
than now" or when tragedies, such as the atomic bomb,
produced high exposure levels.45  Much information on
suspected reproductive health hazards is based on animal
42. See, e.g., Judith A. Scott, Keeping Women in Their Place: Exclusionary Poli-
cies and Reproduction, in DOUBLE EXPOSURE: WOMEN'S HEALTH HAZARDS ON THE
JOB AND AT HOME 180, 183-84 (Wendy Chavkin ed., 1984) [hereinafter DOUBLE EX-
POSURE] (noting that lead exposure, for example, has adverse effects on the repro-
ductive health of men as well as women).
43. See generally Maureen Hatch, Mother, Father, Worker: Men and Women and
the Reproductive Risks of Work, in DOUBLE EXPOSURE, supra note 42, at 161, 161
(noting that the literature regarding occupational exposure to reproductive hazards is
full of conflicting findings and large gaps exist in available literature).
44. For example, although lead is a well-documented fetal hazard at high ex-
posure levels, there is little data available about its reproductive effects at current
exposure levels. Id. at 171.
45. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND MEASUREMENTS,
REP. No. 53, REVIEW OF NCRP RADIATION DOSE LIMIT FOR EMBRYO AND FETUS IN
OCCUPATIONALLY-EXPOSED WOMEN 13-16 (1977) (surveying physical and cognitive
development of children exposed in utero to radiation due to the nuclear bomb deto-
nations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan).
1994]
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studies of uncertain relevance.46  Epidemiological evidence,
evidence from the study of outcomes based on the incidence of
diseases in human populations, is scant and, because of
methodological problems, rarely conclusive.'
Indeed, there is little firm evidence that today jobs present
greater risks for women than for men.48 There is no sound
scientific evidence that risks associated with paternal exposure
are lower than those associated with maternal exposure.49
Few studies have been done on the reproductive risks
associated with male exposure ° because of cultural assump-
tions that mothers are more closely linked to children and are
more responsible for children's problems and disabilities than
are fathers.5 The studies that have been done on paternal
exposure indicate it is likely that agents posing reproductive
risks through maternal exposure are also dangerous through
paternal exposure.52 For example, some toxic agents such as
46. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS IN
THE WORKPLACE 3 (1985) [hereinafter REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS] (noting that
reproductive information derived through animal studies presents unique problems of
interpretation when applied to humans).
47. See id. at 8-9, 67-68. The report cited difficulties with epidemiological stud-
ies on reproductive health hazards, including that the association with workplace
exposure and health damage is based on retrospective information collected after the
worker suffers the damage to her health, exposure types and levels are difficult to
determine, devices for the detection of diminished reproductive function vary in accu-
racy, control groups may be too small or poorly defined, and studies often fail to
control for other variables affecting reproductive capacity, such as lifestyle (including
alcohol, drug, and tobacco use), ethnicity, and disease-related factors. Id.
48. See id. at 68 (stating that no biological evidence supports the assumption
that either women or embryos and fetuses are more susceptible to reproductive haz-
ards than men).
49. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES ON
PREGNANCY AND WORK 3 (U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ., & Welfare, DHEN, NIOSH
Pub. No. 78-118, 1977) [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY].
50. See IAN C.T. NISBET & NATHAN J. KARCH, CHEMICAL HAZARDS TO HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 14 (1983) (stating that the few studies on the effect of male exposure
to toxic chemicals focused on sperm production in men and pregnancy outcomes in
their wives); Joanna F. Haas & David Schottenfeld, Risks to the Offspring from Pa-
rental Occupational Exposures, 21 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 607, 609-12 (1979) (describ-
ing results of the few studies conducted on potential male reproductive hazards,
including chromosal abnormalities in males with occupational vinyl chloride exposure,
chromosome aberrations in men with benzene exposure in the workplace, and in-
creased juvenile cancer rates in children of fathers with occupational exposure to
hydrocarbons); Sandra Blakeslee, Research on Birth Defects Shifts to Flaws in Sperm,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, at Al (noting that research has tended to focus on moth-
ers and fetuses because of their ease of study, compared to fathers).
51. See, e.g., Blakeslee, supra note 50, at A16 (noting scientists' adherence to a
"macho sperm theory of conception," referring to an assumption that a sperm capa-
ble of fertilizing an egg lacks any defects).
52. NISBET & KARCH, supra note 50, at 17; REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS,
supra note 46, at 69-111 (extensively surveying adverse effects on the reproductive
function of men and women from exposure to common workplace chemicals such as
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lead and other heavy metals, pesticides, and solvents "have
been shown to cause infertility in males as well as adverse
pregnancy outcomes resulting from mutations in male germ
cells."53 Paternal exposure to toxic agents can cause harm
because of abnormalities in the fertilizing sperm, the transmis-
sion of dangerous agents through intercourse during pregnancy
such as lead in semen, or because male workers bring
contaminants home on their clothes, hair, skin, and so on.'
The precise relative risks associated with maternal and
paternal exposure at current exposure levels are simply
unknown.55 Often, a fertile male will pose a greater risk to
arsenic, boron, and mercury, to physical agents in the workplace including ionizing
radiation, magnetic fields, and noise, to physical and psychological stress, and to bio-
logical agents in the workplace including rubella, hepatitis B, and recombinant
DNA). One article which surveys known adverse outcomes on reproduction as a re-
sult of male and female toxic exposures concludes that
[t]he scientific basis for differential regulation is limited. Reproduction in-
volves a wider range of processes in females than in males, and some pro-
cesses in females involve critical periods of [fetal] differential [sic] and devel-
opment .... However, it does not necessarily follow that women are more'
sensitive to the action of any given agent. Where extensive data have been
compiled on both sexes (e.g., for anesthetic gases and smelter emissions),
evidence has been found for adverse effects resulting from exposure of both
men and women, including some evidence for adverse fetal effects following
exposure of males .... More evidence is required to establish whether
males and females differ in sensitivity.
NISBET & KARCH, supra note 50, at 114.
53. NISBET & KARCH, supra note 50, at 14 (citing Jeanne M. Manson, Human
and Laboratory Animal Test Systems Available for Detection of Reproductive Failure,
7 PREVENTIVE MED. 322, 322, 327 (1978)) (noting the flawed presumption that em-
ployment policies excluding women from jobs produces a male worker population
that is safe from adverse effects resulting from toxic substance exposure); see also
Jane E. Brody, Sperm Found Especially Vulnerable to Environment: Miscarriages,
Defects, Infertility Linked to Damage by Toxins, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1981, at C1
(noting increasing scientific recognition of the fact that fathers' exposures to environ-
mental and industrial chemicals play a role in pregnancy problems).
54. See RICHARD L. NAEYE & NEBIAT TAFARI, RISK FACTORS IN PREGNANCY AND
DISEASES OF THE FETUS AND NEWBORN 7 (1983) (noting that teratogenic substances
in sperm may damage fertilized ova); NISBI' & KARCH, supra note 50, at 14-15
(noting adverse effects on sperm influenced by chemical agents and the possible
transfer of these agents to the female or fetus during intercourse); Peter Aldhous,
Leukaemia Cases Linked to Fathers' Radiation Dose, 343 NATURE 679, 679 (1990)
(noting a link between fathers' radiation exposure and their children's juvenile leu-
kaemia); Devra L. Davis, Fathers and Fetuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1991, at A27
(summarizing study results indicating that fathers' jobs and lifestyle habits affect
fertility, their spouses' ability to become pregnant, and their children's birth weight
and fetal development); Margaret Seminario, Women Workers: Hazards on the Job,
AFL-CIO AM. FEDERATIONIST, Aug. 1978, at 22 (detailing increased sterility, still-
births, miscarriages, and sperm abnormalities due to male exposure to workplace
toxins).
55. See REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 46, at 3 (stating that what
is unknown about reproductive health hazards far outweighs what is known);
Blakeslee, supra note 50, at Al (stating that "the cause of 60 to 80 percent of birth
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fetal safety than a fertile non-pregnant female.
Spermatogenesis, the rapid division of sperm cells in the
testes, 57 is an ongoing process, whereas the female's ova all
are produced by early infancy, and rapidly dividing cells are
more susceptible to a number of injuries." Also, some
substances such as lead and cadmium "concentrate in the male
reproductive tract [and] are quite toxic to sperm."5 9
Even if maternal exposure were a hundred times more
hazardous to the health of children born or conceived
thereafter than paternal exposure, policies excluding only
fertile women from high-risk jobs, like that adopted by
Johnson Controls, would not be a rational response.60 Under
Johnson Controls' policy, Elsie Nason, a fifty-year-old divorcee
who could not prove sterility, was transferred out of a high-
paying job involving lead exposure, while Donald Penney, a
young married man without children, was denied a request for
a leave of absence to lower his lead level before he and his
wife tried to conceive a child.61
The probability of Elsie Nason becoming pregnant was
close to zero; therefore, the risk to the next generation as a
result of her exposure was also nearly zero.62 Pregnancy rates
are not even published for her age group, and only one woman
out of 5000 between forty-five and forty-nine years old has a
defects is not known"); Brody, supra note 53, at C3 (noting that the study of pater-
nal exposure to hazardous substances is in its infancy).
56. Refer to notes 57-58, 65-66 infra and accompanying text.
57. Blakeslee, supra note 50, at A16.
58. See Donald Whorton et al., Reproductive Disorders, in OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH: RECOGNIZING AND PREVENTING WORK-RELATED DISEASE 307, 308 (Barry S.
Levy & David H. Wegman eds., 1983) (finding that males may be more susceptible
to adverse reproductive effects due to the rapid cell multiplication during spermato-
genesis than females during the relatively slower cell division process of oogenesis,
the egg's maturation prior to ovulation); Blakeslee, supra 50, at A16 (noting that in
contrast to egg cells which females are born with, male sperm cells are particularly
susceptible to genetic damage due to toxic exposures to at least 100 chemicals dur-
ing spermatogenesis).
59. Brody, supra note 53, at C1 (quoting Dr. Leonard Nelson, a reproductive
physiologist at the Medical College of Ohio). Sperm may be damaged or killed by
toxic chemicals in seminal plasma. NISBET & KARCH, supra note 50, at 15.
60. Refer to notes 48-59 supra and accompanying text for a survey of scientific
evidence indicating that reproductive risks associated with pre-conception paternal
exposure to toxic substances are at least as great or greater than those associated
with women's exposure prior to conception.
61. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 192-93
(1991) (noting that both were members of a class consisting of employees affected by
Johnson Controls' Fetal Protection Policy).
62. See Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219, 1233 n.68 (1986) (citing the 1983 census report for the
proposition that for women over 40 the birth rate drops to near zero).
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child in any given year.' On the other hand, Donald Penny
was accumulating significant body lead burdens at the same
time he was trying to have a family.' Exposure to lead can
have a variety of negative reproductive effects in men,
including impotence, sterility, decreased libido, mutative
spermatogenesis, and effects on sperm production, motility, and
morphological features (sperm shape).65 There is evidence that
wives of men exposed to lead are more likely to be childless or
to have spontaneous abortions or stillbirths than women in the
general population.' Also, some evidence indicates that the
incidence of fetal abnormalities is higher than normal for the
children of male workers exposed to lead."7 Intercourse during
pregnancy might be one causal factor in these paternal effects
on fetal outcome, since lead is excreted in seminal fluid.'
Even if the reproductive risks of paternal exposure to lead
were a fraction of those associated with maternal exposure, it
would make no sense to employ Donald Penney in a
hazardous, high exposure job and to exclude Elsie Nason.
This conclusion is consistent with that reached by the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) when
it investigated this issue. During the 1970s, OSHA found evi-
dence of reproductive risk for men as well as for women
exposed to lead and concluded, after extensive hearings, that
"there is no basis whatsoever for the claim that women of
childbearing age should be excluded from the workplace in
order to protect the fetus or the course of pregnancy."69
63. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1989, at 65 (112th ed. 1992).
64. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 192.
65. Medical Surveillance Guidelines, Appendix to OSHA Lead Control Regula-
tions, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 app. C (II)(5), at 833 (1987) [hereinafter Medical Sur-
veillance Guidelines]; Christopher Winder, Reproductive Effects of Occupational Expo-
sures to Leack Policy Considerations, 8 NEuRoToxICOLorY 411, 412-13 (1987); see
also Leo Uzych, Teratogenesis and Mutagenesis Associated with the Exposure of Hu-
man Males to Leacd A Review, 58 YALE J. BIOLOcY & MED. 9, 9-10 (1985) (noting
studies conducted in 1860 and 1910 on lead workers whose wives suffered increased
numbers of stillbirths, spontaneous abortions, and miscarriages).
66. Medical Surveillance Guidelines, supra note 65, at 833; Uzych, supra note
65, at 10; Winder, supra note 65, at 412.
67. See REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 46, at 70 (noting an 1860
study of male lead-exposed workers in which of 32 total pregnancies and 20 live
births, 8 children died within the first year); Uzych, supra note 65, at 14-15 (sum-
marizing research on chromosomal aberrations in lead-exposed male workers); Wind-
er, supra note 65, at 413 (commenting that paternal lead toxicity may affect fetal
development, but adding that evidence supporting this result is not substantial).
68. See Winder, supra note 65, at 412 (suggesting that lead toxicity in seminal
fluid can influence the development of a fetus); Brody, supra note 53, at C3 (noting
that substances carried in seminal fluid can affect the developing embryo, and thus
the father's influence on a pregnancy outcome extends beyond conception).
69. See Occupational Safety and Health Standards: Occupational Exposure to
56 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:43
In litigation, Johnson Controls relied on recent studies by
David Bellinger and four colleagues associating umbilical cord
blood lead levels with physical and neuropsychological
development of the fetus."0 These studies found a correlation
between intrauterine exposure, as measured by umbilical cord
blood lead concentration, and the risk of minor malformations
and delayed cognitive development.7 However, Bellinger and
one co-author, Herbert L. Needleman, protested this use of
their research, saying they "did not measure paternal exposure
and therefore [could] not rule this out as a contributing factor
in [their] findings."72 They noted that, although there have
been fewer studies linking paternal exposure to lead with
reproductive outcome, some, but not all, of these studies have
shown toxic effects."3 They concluded that the fact that less
evidence exists does not signify "differential sensitivity of male
and female workers."74 In sum, "[tihe position that a given
level of paternal but not maternal exposure [to lead] is
acceptable is without logical foundation and insupportable on
empirical grounds."7
This point generally holds true with regard to male and
female exposure to substances in addition to lead.76
Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,953, 52,966 (1978) (including statements in preamble concern-
ing the history of the regulation that preceded enactment of the original OSHA lead
standard); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 app. C (II)(5) (1993) (stating that exposure to lead
can negatively affect reproductive function in both males and females).
70. See Herbert L Needleman & David Bellinger, Recent Developments, 46
ENVTL. RES. 190, 190 (1988) (citing David Bellinger et al., Longitudinal Analyses of
Prenatal and Postnatal Lead Exposure and Early Cognitive Development, 316 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1037, 1037-43 (1987); Herbert L Needleman et al., The Relationship
Between Prenatal Lead Exposure and Congenital Anomalies, 251 J. Am. MED. ASS'N
2956, 2956 (1984) [hereinafter Congenital Anomalies]) (noting that their work was
cited in support of Johnson Controls' policy barring women of childbearing age from
jobs in which blood levels might rise above 30 micrograms per deciliter, but permit-
ting such exposures for all other employees, on the theory that the fetus is "unique-
ly sensitive to low-level exposures").
71. Needleman & Bellinger, supra note 70, at 190; see Bellinger et al., supra
note 70, at 1037 (presenting study results correlating high prenatal lead exposure
with lower cognitive development test scores for infants); Congenital Anomalies, su-
pra note 70, at 2956 (finding lead to be associated with an increased risk for minor
anomalies in fetuses).
72. Bellinger & Needleman, supra note 70, at 190.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 190-91.
76. See REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 46, at 68 (cautioning that
no evidentiary basis exists for assuming that exposure to the vast range of reproduc-
tive toxins poses a greater risk to women, embryos, and fetuses than to men). See
generally id. at 69-110 (summarizing adverse reproductive outcomes due to male,
female, and fetal exposure to industrial substances as diverse as formaldehyde, vinyl
halides, radiation, magnetic fields, infectious agents, and recombinant DNA).
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Nonetheless, in addition to policies regarding lead, more than
a dozen major corporations have policies excluding fertile
women from jobs involving "excessive" exposure to benzene,
vinyl chloride, carbon tetrachloride, carbon monoxide, mercury
and carbon disulfide, toluene, cadmium, coal tar, acrylamide,
and trichloroethylene." For these substances, too little is
known about the precise levels of fetal risk at current occupa-
tional exposure levels of either mothers or fathers to warrant
differential standards based on sex.78 Thus, regardless of the
technicalities of sex discrimination law, the scientific evidence
on workplace hazards cannot support differential treatment of
men and women workers from a policy perspective.
2. 'Protection" Only When Women Are Marginal Workers.
An additional problem from a policy perspective is the pattern
of protection. Women and unborn or unconceived children have
not been "protected" from fetal hazards whenever there is a
workplace with a certain level of fetal hazards. Rather, women
and children have been "protected" only when women are
marginal workers, i.e., only from jobs held predominantly by
men, typically unionized blue collar jobs with relatively high
pay and good medical benefits
As far as I know, only one empirical study has looked at
the circumstances under which policies excluding fertile women
arise. 79 In a 1987 study of Massachusetts chemical and elec-
tronics firms, researchers examined the industrial use of four
substances-lead, radiation, glycol ethers, and mercury-all of
which are known to cause or are strongly suspected of causing
harm to both male and female reproduction.' ° Slightly more
than half of the responding firms reported use of at least one
of these hazardous substances, but only forty percent of these
hazardous workplaces acknowledged that such exposure might
cause reproductive harm."l Twenty percent of the firms had
some restrictions on employment, and all but one of these
policies restricting opportunities for fertile workers applied to
women only. 2 When restrictive policies were present, the
77. Becker, supra note 62, at 1226; Scott, supra note 42, at 180; Seminario,
supra note 54, at 18.
78. See Seminario, supra note 54, at 22 (noting the limited amount of research
in reproductive toxicology, especially with regard to male workers).
79. See also Maureen Paul et al., Corporate Response to Reproductive Hazards in
the Workplace: Results of the Family, Work, and Health Survey, 16 AM. J. INDUS.
MED. 267, 273 (1989).
80. Id. at 270-71.
81. Id. at 271.
82. Id. at 273.
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majority of the workforce was almost always male.8 3
For many women, the choice is between a hazardous
"man's" job and an equally hazardous "woman's" job at lower
pay and with less valuable medical benefits.' Women in
laundries and dry cleaners are exposed to carbon disulfide and
benzene.' Female laboratory technicians are exposed to
benzene and other dangerous chemicals.' Infectious agents
and chemicals create risks of fetal harm to health care
workers, laboratory workers, and hospital laundry workers.'
Dental offices are often contaminated by mercury.' Pottery
painting, a traditionally female job, involves exposure to
lead.89  Elementary school teachers, doctors' office
receptionists, child care workers, and mothers are often
exposed to illnesses that can be hazardous to fetuses, such as
German measles and other viral diseases.9° Taxi drivers are
exposed to noxious fumes and risk accidents, either of which
can harm a fetus.9 However, all possibly fertile women have
83. See id. at 273 (reporting that more than four-fifths of Massachusetts chemi-
cal and electronic firms that excluded broad categories of women from jobs had pri-
marily male workforces).
84. See Mary E. Becker, Sterile Women Only Need Apply: Fetal Protection Poli-
cies and Johnson Controls, 1991 WL 330749, at *3 (Jan. 1991) (published exclusively
in Westlaw) (arguing that the better choice for potential children is to have their
mothers work in higher paying hazardous men's jobs with better medical benefits
rather than in hazardous, lower paying women's jobs).
85. David L. Kirp, Fetal Hazards, Gender Justice, and the Justices: The Limits
of Equality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 101, 115-16 (1992) (citing NANCY M. CHENIER,
REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AT WORK 44-45 (1982)).
86. See Seminario, supra note 54, at 19 (noting that laboratory workers are ex-
posed to potentially hazardous chemicals including the suspected carcinogens benzene
and benzidine).
87. See Linda Coleman & Cindy Dickinson, The Risks of Healing: The Hazards
of the Nursing Profession, in DOUBLE EXPOSURE, supra note 42, at 37, 44-50 (noting
the numerous fetal and reproductive risk posing substances that nurses are exposed
to in hospitals); Seminario, supra note 54, at 19-22 (listing the infectious agents and
toxic chemicals that laboratory workers, health care workers, and hospital laundry
workers are exposed to, and noting that these agents may injure a fetus during
development).
88. See James C. Hyatt, Protection for Unborn? Work-Safety Issue Isn't As Sim-
ple as It Sounds, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1977, at Al, A31 (noting that mercury often
contaminates dental offices where many young women work).
89. See Jeanne M. Stellman & Mary S. Henifin, No Fertile Women Need Apply:
Employment Discrimination and Reproductive- Hazards in the Workplace, in BIOLOGI-
CAL WOMAN-THE CONVENIENT MYTH 115, 120 (Ruth Hubbard et al. eds., 1982).
90. See Scott, supra note 42, at 180, 182 (stating that 83% of elementary
teachers are female and that their exposure to German measles and other viruses
poses a significant risk to fetuses in utero during the first trimester of pregnancy).
91. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 917
(7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (questioning how fetal risk
from maternal lead exposure in a factory compares to the hazard of driving a taxi
in order to highlight the fundamental illogicality of Johnson Controls' exclusionary
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not been excluded from jobs such as these.92 Rather, such
policies have arisen only for higher paying men's jobs.93
This pattern should not be surprising. An employer faced
with evidence that a group is hypersusceptible is likely to
make the decision to exclude that group based, not on the
costs and benefits to the workers and their families, but on
the employer's need for members of that group in its labor
force. If the group is very marginal-as women are in tradi-
tionally male jobs-the employer has every incentive to exclude
the group's members even though the heightened risks may be
very low (or only vague worries) and the benefits of allowing
the group to work (benefits to women and their children) are
very high. Women are "marginal" potential workers for
traditionally male blue-collar jobs in the sense that women are
likely to be less attractive as employees than men are.
Employing women in these jobs entails added costs in
providing washrooms and, for many jobs involving exposure to
hazardous chemicals, showers for washing off chemicals at the
end of the work day. Protective equipment, clothing, and tools
designed for women rather than men may be necessary. Often,
men in traditionally male jobs are hostile to women as co-
workers. Admitting women is therefore likely to be disruptive
and employers understandably dislike disruptions and disputes
among employees. In such an environment new women
employees may be less productive than new men employees
because, for example, on-the-job training by co-workers may be
more difficult for the women to negotiate successfully.
Policies excluding all fertile women have arisen mostly,
perhaps entirely, in unionized industries with rigid pay
scales.9' Employers in these industries cannot offset the high
costs of employing women by paying women lower wages,
because such a differential would be an obvious violation of
the Equal Pay Act.95 In addition, unionized employers are
likely to pay higher than average wages and therefore can
job policy), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
92. Seminario, supra note 54, at 18 (recognizing that approximately 70% of all
working women are employed in clerical, service and professional technical jobs).
93. See Becker, supra note 62, at 1239 n.100 (noting the development of two
corporation's fetal protection policies, which excluded pregnant or fertile women from
production jobs after women began bidding for the jobs).
94. For example, companies known to have had policies excluding all fertile
women from certain jobs prior to the Supreme Court decision in Johnson Controls,
include Olin, American Cyanamid, Union Carbide, General Motors, Bunker Hill, Al-
lied Chemical, B.F. Goodrich, Monsanto, St. Joe's Minerals, ASARCO, Sun Oil, Gulf
Oil, and Delco-Remy.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
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usually hire as many workers as needed without employing
women. These employers are therefore the only employers
likely to exclude all fertile women because of fetal hazards,
and are likely to do so for those jobs, higher-paying men's jobs,
which would pay women the most.
Thus, from a policy perspective, a second problem with
fetal vulnerability polices that exclude all women or all fertile
women from certain jobs is that they "protect" (exclude) women
and children only from higher paying men's jobs, leaving
women free to run equal risks in lower paying women's jobs
(where they are less likely to have good medical insurance).
Protecting children by denying women relatively high-paying
men's jobs can be an effective way of protecting children only
if one forgets that women are economic actors, financially
responsible for their children's welfare. Even a safer, lower-
paying alternative job may not be in the best interest of a
woman's living children or of her unborn or unconceived
children, whose future well-being is also likely to be linked to
maternal income.
Unlike the employer, who will not take into account
benefits of employment either to the employee or to the
employee's family in deciding whom to "protect" from
reproductive hazards, the individual woman can take into ac-
count the advantages and disadvantages of a particular job for
herself and her dependents, including her living as well as
future children, in light of the probability that she will have
another child while fetal health is at risk from occupational
exposure. 6
The case for "protection" might seem strongest when a
woman is actually pregnant, so that the risk to the fetus is
less speculative. However, when an employer fires a pregnant
worker to ensure fetal safety, the result may be unemployment
and loss of employment-related benefits. Alternative
employment is difficult for a pregnant woman to find. When
fired, she may lose her only source of both income and health
insurance.9 7  Good nutrition and medical care during
96. Such a decision will be made in light of the information on health hazards
that employers are required to provide. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.96(i) (1993) (re-
quiring that employers inform employees of the presence of radioactive materials and
associated safety problems); id. § 1910.1025(l) (requiring that each employer involved
in activities that might expose employees to airborne lead inform employees of the
regulations set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 and appendices concerning lead-related
health and safety measures).
97. Terminated female workers may retain health insurance under the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992). COBRA allows workers to continue coverage under their former
[Vol. 31:43
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pregnancy are important from the child's point of view.9" An
employer policy that mandates firing pregnant workers to
"ensure" fetal health may do far more harm than good, even
from only the fetus' perspective.
A final problem with the pattern of protection is that
fertile men have never been excluded from jobs because of
reproductive hazards. As indicated above, there is much evi-
dence to indicate that many fetal risks are associated with
paternal exposure,9 yet no employer has switched to an
entirely sterile work force, excluding fertile men as well as
fertile women from desirable jobs."°° Consider the response to
the pesticide DBCP. In the late 1970s, high levels of infertility
and sterility were discovered in male workers exposed to this
chemical.' 0 ' However, employers did not switch to all-female
work forces or to sterile work forces.0 2 Instead, the EPA
simply banned the chemical for most uses three years after it
was known to cause sterility in male workers. 10 3 When
women are faced with a reproductive hazard, they lose their
jobs; when men are faced with a reproductive hazard, the
employer's health plan if they pay the premiums formerly paid by their employers.
Id. Many terminated employees, however, fail to take advantage of the health cov-
erage extension period under COBRA because of their inability to afford the premi-
ums. See Jeffrey R. Pettit, Comment, Help! We've Fallen and We Can't Get Up: The
Problems Families Face Because of Employment-Based Health Insurance, 46 VAND. L.
REv. 779, 796 (1993).
98. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 918
(7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting the strong correlation
between the health of the infant and prenatal medical care and nutrition), rev'd, 499
U.S. 187 (1991).
99. Refer to notes 48-59 supra and accompanying text.
100. See Becker, supra note 62, at 1226 (listing the names of companies that
have adopted fetal protection policies excluding all fertile women from jobs involving
exposure to suspected dangerous chemicals).
101. See Sonia Jasso & Maria Mazorra, Following the Harvest: The Health Haz-
ards of Migrant and Seasonal Farmworking Women, in DOUBLE EXPOSURE, supra
note 42, at 86, 95 (noting the 1976 discovery that DBCP, a pesticide, caused sterility
in men involved in manufacturing the chemical).
102. See id. at 95-96 (contrasting the response to DBCP's adverse reproductive
affects on men with the response to the pesticide TOK, which causes birth defects in
the children of exposed women). The authors noted no shift in hiring patterns in
response to the risk of sterility for male farm workers associated with DBCP. Id. In
contrast, the EPA's warning statement about the birth defect risks associated with
women's TOK exposure led employers, or allowed them, to refuse to hire women
farm workers. Id. at 96.
103. See REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 46, at 35-36 (noting that
governmental agencies respond differently when dealing with the reproductive risks
faced by men as opposed to the risks faced by women, and providing DBCP as an
example of the government banning a chemical outright because it was shown to
cause sterility in men); Jasso & Mazorra, supra note 101, at 95 (noting that male
reproductive capacity was endangered by DBCP, but men of reproductive age were
not removed from their jobs).
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hazard is removed. 1°
A number of factors explain the greater likelihood of
"protecting" children from risks associated with maternal
rather than paternal occupational exposure. When we think of
women and children, we tend to think only of women's
reproductive role at conception, during pregnancy, and during
and after childbirth. 5 When we think of men and children,
we are likely to think immediately of men's economic
responsibilities; the father's physical link to the child at
conception is likely to seem of far more marginal importance
than the mother's many physical links to her child."° With
the economic link between fathers and children at the fore, we
can easily see that keeping fathers from high-paying jobs may
well be counterproductive for their children.'0 7
In addition, we see men as autonomous actors with their
own interests in jobs and careers independent of their
families.'" We are more likely to see women primarily in
terms of their non-economic reproductive roles, and less likely
to see them as independent actors with their own interests in
jobs and careers independent of their children.' 9
Taken together, these various policy problems suggest that
even were fetal risks the same for men and women, as they
are likely to be for at least some hazards, we would tend to
see the pattern of "protection" that arose prior to the Supreme
104. For an example of a male reproductive hazard routinely ignored, refer to
notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text (discussed lead).
105. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281, 1308-09 (1991) (arguing that the male-dominated social conception of
procreation with its emphasis on women's role from conception through child-rearing
forms the basis for discriminatory legal treatment of women in the workplace).
106. See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limita-
tions of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 79, 84-93 (1989) (arguing that the male conflict between work and family
arises in part from the stereotype that constricts the role of men to primarily that
of breadwinners).
107. A significant proportion of jobs barely provide a minimal income sufficient
for a primary wage earner to support a family. Id. at 109-10 n.100. If men are kept
from high-paying jobs, these same men might be unable to secure employment with
high enough incomes to provide adequately for the nutritional and health-care needs
of their families. Id. The trade-off, therefore, between the risk due to a father's job-
related exposure and the risk due to potential poverty may be counterproductive
from the viewpoint of the child.
108. See id. at 91-98 (stating that men are socialized to define themselves by
their work and noting that the employee role is kept separate from family re-
sponsibilities by an implicit term of the social employment contract).
109. Catharine MacKinnon believes that the gender-neutral approach of discrimi-
nation law ignores the fact that women's poverty, financial dependency, motherhood,
and "sexual accessibility" comprises women's status as women. CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscOURSFS ON LIFE AND LAW 73 (1987).
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Court's decision in Johnson Controls."' Moreover, this policy
analysis indicates that employers cannot "protect" children by
excluding fertile women from high-paying jobs or by firing
pregnant women. Such policies both discriminate on the basis
of sex, turning perceived differences between women and men
into advantages for men and disadvantages for women,
111
and fail to ensure the well-being of future generations. 112 It
seems likely, however, that the judges on the federal appellate
courts who decided the fetal vulnerability cases were affected
by some of the same biases and stereotypes as those affecting
employers." 3
C. The Supreme Court Decision in Johnson Controls
All nine of the Supreme Court Justices deciding Johnson
Controls agreed that a policy closing certain hazardous jobs to
fertile women discriminated on its face against women and
therefore violated Title VII, unless sex was a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the job." 4 Although the
employer argued that it was not motivated by any intention to
110. Refer to notes 79-93 supra and accompanying text for a description of typi-
cal employment policies for fetal protection, primarily exclusion of women from blue
collar positions in predominately male workforces.
111. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 116 (1979) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT]
(stating that sex discrimination "is a system that defines women as inferior from
men" and that disadvantages women for their differences from men).
112. Refer to notes 48-59 supra and accompanying text for a summary of scien-
tific evidence on reproductive risks associated with fathers who are exposed to toxic
workplace substances. Fetal protection policies that exclude pregnant women or fer-
tile women from jobs, but not men, in effect only exclude half of the adult popula-
tion from jobs in which exposure poses a risk to future generations.
113. Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990); International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S.
187 (1991); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright
v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692
F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982). Refer to notes 11-20 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the legal analysis used by the circuit courts. When the disadvantages
to children of firing pregnant women was plain in light of the obvious alternative of
transferring the pregnant workers to less hazardous jobs, two courts considering
such situations ruled in favor of the pregnant workers. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1546-51
(stressing that the defendant hospital should have examined alternative employment
for the plaintiff, an X-ray technician, before firing her upon learning of her pregnan-
cy); Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 987-94 (finding that the defendant hospital violated Title
VII by forcing the plaintiff, a pregnant X-ray technician, to resign instead of allow-
ing her to take a leave of absence).
114. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 189 (Blackmun, J.); id at 211 (White, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., & Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
see id. at 223 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (pinpointing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 as the source for finding Johnson Control's policy facially
discriminatory, and assuming the BFOQ defense applied).
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discriminate against women, but only by its desire to avoid
causing harm to future generations, the Court held that "the
absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially
discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a
discriminatory effect.""' The Court rejected the convoluted
reasoning of the lower federal courts, discussed earlier, which
held challenges to similar policies as disparate impact cases
subject to a business necessity defense, rather than as
disparate treatment cases.116
Because the Johnson Controls Court recognized a policy
limiting fertile women's employment opportunities as treating
women and men differently, the crux of the Court's decision is
its discussion of the BFOQ cases.1 The issue was whether
the BFOQ cases involving safety cases support use of the
BFOQ to exclude all fertile women for the safety of unborn
and unconceived offspring."8  The earlier cases involved
slightly different fact situations, however. In both cases
discussed in detail by the Court, Dothard v. Rawlinson"9
and Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell,12° the employer's
safety concern was directly related to job performance as it af-
fected the safety of prison inmates or customers.' The ma-
jority of the Court distinguished Johnson Controls from
Dothard and Criswell on the ground that Johnson Controls'
BFOQ defense was unrelated to job qualifications, that is, to
women's ability to perform the assigned tasks."2 In the cases
recognizing a BFOQ defense, "the safety of third parties" was
indispensably related "to the particular business at issue."
i23
The Court regarded "unconceived fetuses of Johnson Controls'
115. Id at 199.
116. Id. at 198 (criticizing the disparate impact analysis used by the Eleventh
Circuit in Hayes, and by the Fourth Circuit in Wright). Refer to note 34-37 supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the circuit courts' rationales for employing
disparate impact as opposed to disparate treatment analysis.
117. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199-207 (discussing the BFOQ safety de-
fense, which requires a showing that all or substantially all of the employers in the
excluded category cannot perform the essence of their jobs without endangering third
parties).
118. Id. at 200.
119. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
120. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
121. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202-03; see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334 (ac.
cepting Alabama's safety-based BFOQ defense to justify state correctional facility's
exclusion of women from security positions in men's maximum security prison);
Criswell, 472 U.S. at 422-23 (rejecting airline's safety concerns for airline passengers
as BFOQ defense justifying discrimination against flight engineers over the age of
60).
122. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 203-04.
123. Id. at 202-03 (discussing Dothard and Criswell).
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female employees ... [as] neither customers nor third parties
whose safety is essential to the business of battery manufac-
turing. "124 The Court also noted that earlier Supreme Court
decisions had allowed the BFOQ defense only on a showing
that "all or substantially all women would be unable to per-
form safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved."'"
The Court pointed out that Johnson Controls had not shown
any factual basis for believing that this standard was met.
126
The Court therefore declined to extend the narrow safety
BFOQ exception to Johnson Controls' policy excluding all
fertile women from certain jobs.127
The Court also dismissed Johnson Controls' argument that,
given potential tort liability for damage to a fetus as a result
of maternal exposure, a policy excluding fertile women was
reasonable and permissible under Title VII.'" The majority
made a number of points in responding to this argument,
noting that added costs associated with employing women are
not, in general, a defense to discrimination" and that
without a finding of negligence on the part of the employer,
the imposition of tort liability would be unlikely.13° In fact,
the majority noted that Johnson Controls had not shown that
it faced any costs as a result of tort liability, and if there were
a conflict between Title VII's anti-discrimination mandate and
state tort liability, Title VII would preempt state tort law.
13
The majority concluded that absent potentially ruinous tort
liability, employers cannot respond to concerns for fetal safety
by implementing employment policies that exclude women.'32
Four Justices filed concurring opinions. Justice White,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, agreed
124. Id at 203.
125. Id. at 207 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,
235 (5th Cir. 1969)); see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 (quoting Weeks with approv-
al).
126. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 207. The Court noted that the company's
moral and ethical concerns for the safety of children born to employees did not con-
stitute evidence in support of a BFOQ defense to a charge of overt sex discrimina-
tion. Id. at 206. The Court also recognized that "[d]ecisions about the welfare of
future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise
them rather than to the employers who hire those parents." Id.
127. Id. at 206-07.
128. Id at 208.
129. See id. at 209-10. The Court noted, however, that costs which "would be so
prohibitive as to threaten the survival of the employer's business" might constitute a
defense to discrimination. Id. at 210-11.
130. Id. at 208.
131. See id. at 210 (stating that Congress' goals in enacting Title VII would be
thwarted if state tort law excused or furthered discriminatory hiring).
132. Id. at 210-11.
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that the Johnson Controls' policy discriminated on its face and
therefore must be analyzed under the disparate treatment
model with its BFOQ defense.'33 But Justice White would
allow the BFOQ defense to include safety concerns related to
third parties, particularly if tort liability imposed significant
costs on an employer.1" Justice White agreed, however, with
the majority's remand of the case for further proceedings
because the record was insufficient for Johnson Controls to
establish such a BFOQ defense. 13 5
Justice Scalia, writing separately, concurred in the
judgment and with Justice White's conclusion that increased
costs, including tort costs, could be considered relevant to a
BFOQ defense even though not so heavy as to be ruinous.'1
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment because Johnson Con-
trols did not assert a cost-based defense.'37
The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls is
133. Id. at 211.
134. Id. at 212-13.
135. See id. at 220-22 (finding sufficient evidence for the petitioners so that sum-
mary judgment in Johnson Controls' favor was inappropriate, but allowing the em-
ployer to present evidence as to a BFOQ defense based on substantial tort liability).
In closing, Justice White criticized the decision below to discount the evidence
of male reproductive risks associated with lead "merely because it was based on
animal studies." Id. at 215. Justice White noted that the Supreme Court has ap-
proved the use of animal studies in assessing risk. Id.
136. Id. at 223.
137. Id. at 223-24. Justice Scalia made two additional points in his separate con-
currence. First, he argued that the evidence of male reproductive risk associated
with lead was irrelevant because, under the PDA, pregnancy discrimination is sex
discrimination regardless of evidence of male reproductive risk. Id. at 223. Second,
Justice Scalia criticized as irrelevant the majority's "all or substantially all" BFOQ
defense analysis. Id. at 223. He concluded that this reasoning was irrelevant because
the PDA requires that men and women be treated equally even if all women place
their children at risk by taking hazardous jobs. Id.
Third, Justice Scalia would have interpreted the BFOQ defense to permit cost
considerations, even when not ruinous to the employer. Id. at 224. Justice Scalia's
objection to a BFOQ defense in Johnson Controls' situation is not a wholesale rejec-
tion of a cost-based BFOQ defense. See id. (giving as an example of an acceptable
cost-based BFOQ defense to discriminatory hiring, the case of an employer that re-
fuses to hire pregnant women as crew members on a long voyage because of the
cost to equip on-board facilities to deal with foreseeable pregnancy emergencies).
Rather, Scalia advocated an employer-friendly interpretation of the BFOQ defense,
based on additional costs associated with employing women. See id. (suggesting that
increased costs alone can support a BFOQ defense). Under this approach, women
can be excluded from jobs even if substantially all women could perform them safely
and efficiently.
Fourth, Justice Scalia stated that, like the majority, he was willing to assume
that an "action required by Title VII cannot give rise to liability under state tort
law." Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 223. Scalia stated that Title VII accommodates
state tort law through the BFOQ exception. Id. Thus, Scalia would allow tort liabili-
ty to provide the basis for a BFOQ defense if the employer had shown "a substan-
tial risk of tort liability," a showing which Johnson Controls had not made. Id.
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refreshing in its clarity, especially for readers familiar with the
lower court decisions in this area. The Court saw the
company's policy as overtly discriminating on the basis of
sex."8 Thus the only question was the availability of the
BFOQ defense."3 9 The majority's stated reason for disallowing
this defense, that the safety of unconceived fetuses is not a
concern essential to the business of battery manufacturing,
140
draws a rather formalistic and wooden distinction between
Johnson Controls' policy and other policies where the Court
had found a BFOQ defense when safety concerns for third
parties involved an essential aspect of the employer's
business.14 ' True, the BFOQ cases involving safety were
based on concern for customer safety and therefore relevant to
job performance, rather than on concern for the safety of third
parties such as unborn or unconceived children. But the Court
never explains why this distinction should control. 42
There are, however, good reasons for disallowing the
BFOQ safety defense in cases dealing with fetal vulnerability
policies. First, if the policy excludes all fertile women from
certain jobs, the needs of individual living women and their
living children are being subordinated to the "needs" of beings
who may never exist. This is a far cry from protecting living,
breathing, clients, customers, and prisoners. Second, to
conclude that fetal vulnerability policies banning either all
pregnant or all fertile women from certain jobs "protect"
children, one must ignore women's economic responsibilities to
their families. Children's interests are linked to parental
economic interests in a way without parallel for the
relationship between an especially risky employee and
customers, clients, or prisoners. 143
138. I& at 197.
139. I& at 200.
140. Id at 203.
141. See id. at 200-06 (emphasizing the language of Title VII's BFOQ provision
and the PDA, the legislative history of each, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977), and Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) to illustrate the
narrow scope of the BFOQ "safety exception" defense).
142. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 205 (merely stating that because
unconceived fetuses are neither customers nor third parties whose safety is essential
to Johnson Controls' business, the employer could not rely upon a BFOQ defense to
justify its fetal protection policy).
143. Neither the Supreme Court nor the defendant employers in Dothard or
Criswell suggested that the decision concerning the employment of a particular per-
son who might pose a safety risk to third parties was a decision appropriate for the
individual employee to make. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,
413-23 (1985) (examining whether the employers decision to ground all flight safety
engineers for safety reasons survived challenge under the ADEA); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-37 (1977) (scrutinizing whether the state employer's
1994]
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Third, employees, if given adequate warnings of
reproductive hazards, are likely to consider the disadvantages
of employment in light of such risks in deciding whether to
take a job, and are more likely to internalize such costs in
assessing the advantages and disadvantages of employment
than they are to include in their calculation the cost their
employment poses in terms of the safety of customers, clients,
or prisoners. Employees may, of course, fail to weigh costs
associated with reproductive hazards perfectly. But employers
adopting fetal vulnerability polices are no more likely to make
perfect decisions in light of reproductive hazards; employers
have no incentive to consider the advantages of risky parental
employment to workers' families. As between employees and
employers that exclude parents or potential parents from haz-
ardous jobs, employees are likely to be the better
decisionmakers.
Commentators have criticized the Johnson Controls
decision for placing the burden of ensuring reproductive safety
on parents.' 4 For example, in an editorial piece in the Los
Angeles Daily Journal, feminist Ruth Rosen referred to
Johnson Controls as a "hollow victory" giving women the right
"to endanger one's life and potential offspring."'45  The
Johnson Controls opinion does state that "[d]ecisions about the
welfare of future children must be left to the parents who
conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the
employers of those parents."" But the Court here does not
decision to exclude women from contact jobs as correctional officers in a maximum
security prison violated Title VII).
144. Ruth Rosen, Equal Opportunity Jeopardy, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 3, 1991, at 6;
see also Joseph Losco, Fetal Rights and Feminism, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: THE
DIFFERENCE DEBATE 231, 250-51 (Leslie F. Goldstein ed., 1992); Gary Minda, Title
VII at the Crossroads of Employment Discrimination Law and Postmodern Feminist
Theory: United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. and Its Implications for the
Women's Rights Movement, 11 ST. LOUiS U. PUB. L. REv. 89, 91 (1992) (noting that
Johnson Controls placed responsibilities for fetal safety upon employees rather than
upon their employers); Jennifer Morton, Pregnancy in the Workplace Sex-Specific
Fetal Protection Policies-UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.-A Victory for Women?, 59
TENN. L. REV. 616, 634 (1992) (hailing Johnson Controls as a decision giving women
more control over their employment status, but criticizing the opinion for giving
women the "right to risk good health" for themselves and future children rather
than expanding the alternatives for working women).
145. Rosen, supra note 144, at 6.
146. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206. Elsewhere the Court states: "It is no
more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual employers to decide whether
a woman's reproductive role is more important to herself and her family than her
economic role. Congress has left this choice to the woman as hers to make." Id. at
211. This language does not absolve employers of responsibility for workplace haz-
ards; it only means that Congress has given women the ability to decide whether
the economic necessity of employment outweighs the reproductive risks. See id. at
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indicate that parental choice of a hazardous job absolves the
employer of the responsibility to provide a reasonably safe
work place. Rather, the Court only states that as between
employers and parents (in the context of a case dealing with
who should decide whether certain jobs are open to parents or
potential parents), parents are better decisionmakers. There
are strong reasons, explained above, why this should be so.147
It does not follow that employers therefore have no obligation
to limit reproductive injuries in the workplace, particularly
when such injuries can be limited at reasonable cost.' Nor
can it be concluded that women and children would be better
off had Johnson Controls been decided the other way.149
208, 211 (recognizing that OSHA standards for workplace safety must still be satis-
fied and concluding that women are the proper decision makers concerning fetal
health).
147. Id. at 208. At one point, the Court indicates that employer negligence may
establish liability for reproductive injuries. Id. Absent a showing of employer negli-
gence, liability in tort is unlikely. See id. (noting that if Title VII will not allow an
employer to exclude women from jobs posing reproductive hazards, and if the em-
ployer informs female employees of the risks and does not act negligently, liability is
improbable). Although commentators may wish to hold employers strictly liable for
fetal defects or reproductive difficulties due to workplace exposure, courts are not
likely to impose strict liability absent legislation clearly doing so. See id. at 223.
Justice Scalia quoted Judge Easterbrook's dissent in the Seventh Circuit's decision to
the effect that the legislative forum is available for those who wish to change Title
VII, either to take the decision about occupational choice from parents and give it to
employers or to hold employers strictly liable for fetal harm due to employees'
workplace exposure. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Refer to notes 160-63 infra and ac-
companying text (explaining that there are no known cases in which workplace fetal
hazards have lead to employer liability and discussing the reasons why neither strict
tort liability nor negligence-based tort liability in such cases is likely). But see
Christine N. OBrien et al., Employer Fetal Protection Policies at Work: Balancing
Reproductive Hazards with Title VII Rights, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 147, 177-78 (1991)
(suggesting that the possibility of tort liability may not be remote).
Nothing in Johnson Controls suggests that parental "choice" absolves employ-
ers of responsibility for reasonably safe workplaces. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S.
at 211-12 (White, J., concurring) (suggesting that a fetal protection policy would be
justified if the exclusion of pregnant women from a particular position was reason-
ably necessary to avoid tort liability which might arise as a result of workplace
hazards); see also Minda, supra note 144, at 114-16 (noting that even after Johnson
Controls, employers may nonetheless be bound by common law tort duties to prevent
fetal injury).
148. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 208 (discussing employers' responsibilities
for ensuring standards of workplace safety established by the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA)); see, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k)(ii) (1993) (requiring the
temporary removal of an employee from exposure to lead when a medical determina-
tion has been made to establish that the employee's medical condition places her at
an increased risk of harm from exposure to lead); Clyde Summers, Comment, Effec-
tive Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 457, 500 (1992) (summarizing the general duty on employers to provide
employees a place of work free from known hazards).
149. For a discussion of the unfortunate economic effects likely to result when a
woman is excluded from employment under a fetal protection policy, refer to notes
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To be sure, Johnson Controls at least suggests that
responsibility for reproductive injuries should rest on the
parents who are, after all, the decisionmakers,' 50 particularly
in light of the Court's subsequent discussion of possible federal
preemption of state tort liability.1 There is validity to this
objection. As the Court noted, were states to impose tort
liability for conduct required by Title VII, federal law would
preempt state tort law. This might seem to suggest that the
Court viewed state tort liability for reproductive hazards
associated with maternal occupational exposure as inappropri-
ate. But, the Court characterized the tort-liability argument as
involving "two equally unpersuasive propositions." 52 The first
was that Johnson Controls was trying "to solve the problem of
reproductive health hazards by resorting to an [illegal sex-
based] exclusionary policy." At this point, the Court clearly
stated that the anti-discrimination mandate of Title VII does
not eliminate employer responsibility for workplace safety:
"Title VII plainly forbids illegal sex discrimination as a method
of diverting attention from an employer's obligation to police
the workplace."153  The second "unpersuasive proposition"
identified by the Court in the employer's tort liability argu-
ment was "a fear that fertile women will cost more." But this
too was rejected by the Court: "The extra cost of employing
members of one sex, however, does not provide an affirmative
Title VII defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire members
of that gender."" 4
Thus, despite the possible preemption of state tort law if it
imposed liability on employers for injuries associated with
maternal employment, in the end the Court sees the duty to
"police" the workplace for safety as remaining on the employer
and sees additional tort liability associated with employing
women as not entirely consistent with Title VII. As an aside,
the Court leaves open the possibility that "ruinous" tort
96-98 supra and accompanying text. For a description of the negative reproductive
effects associated with paternal exposure, which would occur even if women were
excluded from hazardous jobs, refer to notes 48-59 supra and accompanying text.
150. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206, 211 (suggesting that by enacting
Title VII's ban on sex discrimination and the PDA, Congress has left the choice
concerning fetal and reproductive risks to be encountered in the workplace to wom-
en, free from interference by employers and the courts).
151. Id- at 209-10.
152. Id at 209.
153. Id at 210.
154. See id. (noting that Congress considered and rejected the idea that employ-
ers could discriminate on the basis of pregnancy and related conditions, despite the
social costs associated with employing fertile women).
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liability might be the basis for a BFOQ defense, 155 but as
discussed in Part III of this Article, there is no evidence of
such liability yet.'"
The Supreme Court decision in Johnson Controls leaves
open and unresolved a number of important questions in
addition to the permissible and appropriate scope of state tort
law and whether a BFOQ defense would be available to an
employer facing catastrophic tort liability as the result of
employing women. Other questions include: When, if at all,
can employers treat employees differentially in terms of
reproductive risk?57 Can employers adopt policies that apply
only to pregnant workers when there is good reason to think
reproductive risk is especially high during pregnancy?"s
What problems remain for employees and employers in dealing
with jobs posing reproductive hazards in light of Johnson Con-
trols?'59  These questions are explored in the next two
sections.
III. PERMISSIBLE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYEES
Under Johnson Controls, fertile women and men cannot be
treated differently on the basis of reproductive risk, except
perhaps if ruinous tort liability is associated with employment
of fertile women but not fertile men."6 To date, tort liability
for reproductive workplace hazards has not been a significant
problem. 6 ' If it should become so serious as to threaten the
155. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210-11 (withholding judgment as to
whether a BFOQ defense might be permissible when the costs associated with hiring
women were 'so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of the employer's business");
Morton, supra note 144, at 632 (recognizing that the Court did not answer the ques-
tion of whether an exclusionary policy might survive judicial scrutiny if the extra
costs of employing female employees was "crippling"). Refer to notes 128-37 supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the various degrees of tort liability that
the Johnson Controls plurality opinions considered sufficient to establish a BFOQ
defense.
156. Refer to notes 256-74 infra and accompanying text (explaining that the per-
ceived conflict between state tort liability and Title VII's prohibition of sex-specific
fetal protection policies is largely theoretical because the likelihood of state tort lia-
bility is limited).
157. Refer to notes 160-85 infra and accompanying text.
158. Refer to notes 161-85 infra and accompanying text.
159. Refer to notes 201-74 infra and accompanying text.
160. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 210-
11 (1991) (leaving unanswered the question of whether the increased costs of em-
ploying fertile women could justify an employer's facially discriminatory fetal protec-
tion policy).
161. Refer to notes 256-74 infra and accompanying text (discussing the narrow
possibility of tort liability); cf. Morton, supra note 144, at 635 n.138 (suggesting that
although companies often claim that exclusionary policies are necessary to avoid
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economic viability of an employer and pertains only to
employment of one sex while fertile, the Johnson Controls
decision leaves open the possibility that an employer might
then be able to discriminate on the basis of sex under Title
VII's BFOQ defense.'62 How the Court would actually rule in
such a case is not clear.'63 The problems with allowing
employers to act as decisionmakers in such situations are dis-
cussed in detail in part III.B.
Short of sex-linked ruinous tort liability, Johnson Controls
holds that an employer cannot treat fertile women and men
differently by excluding only one sex from desirable jobs while
the employee is fertile.' 64 Other distinctions are, however,
imaginable. Three in particular seem especially likely to arise.
First, may an employer offer different warnings to fertile
women and men, warnings designed to give information about
their respective reproductive risks?165  Second, may an
employer offer different options to pregnant or fertile women
or men trying to become parents, such as temporary transfers
designed to minimize reproductive risk?" Third, what
policies would be permissible for only pregnant workers with
respect to hazardous jobs?167
Different kinds of warnings for women and men can take
many forms. For example, an employer might only warn
members of one sex about reproductive hazards in the
workplace."6 Johnson Controls followed this approach prior
to its adoption of the policy excluding only fertile women from
liability for fetal injury, such liability is a negligible source of potential liability giv-
en the broad range of potential liabilities confronting most businesses).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e-2(e) (1988).
163. In Johnson Controls, the Court did not expressly state that ruinous tort
liability would support a sex-specific exclusionary policy, but did hold that the in-
creased costs of employing fertile women cannot support such a policy absent evi-
dence that the costs threaten "the survival of the employer's business." Johnson Con-
trols, 499 U.S. at 210-11.
Despite the resignation of Justices White and Marshall from the Johnson Con-
trols Court and their replacement by Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, these changes
seem unlikely to radically alter the Court's approach to cases in this area. See Jesse
H. Choper, Benchmarks, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 78, 78-80 (presenting the view that
Ginsburg's appointment will not make a substantial difference in any area of consti-
tutional doctrine including the area of reproductive rights). But cf. Morton, supra
note 144, at 633 (arguing that if Justice Thomas sides with the four concurring Jus-
tices in Johnson Controls, the extra costs associated with the employment of women
could justify a policy excluding women from certain jobs).
164. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 200.
165. Refer to notes 168-74 infra and accompanying text.
166. Refer to notes 175-82 infra and accompanying text.
167. Refer to notes 175-85 infra and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 191 (providing an example of warn-
ings about lead exposure that were directed solely to female employees).
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hazardous jobs.'69  The employer told women that lead
exposure was a fetal hazard and "that a woman who expected
to have a child should not choose a job in which she would
have such exposure." 7 ° A woman wishing nevertheless to
take a job involving lead exposure was required "to sign a
statement that she had been advised of the risk of having a
child while she was exposed to lead."' 7 ' Men were given no
warning of their reproductive risks. Some evidence suggests
that after the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls,
the company may have returned to its earlier policy of giving
only women information about the risks of maternal employ-
ment.'72 This policy, if in place, should be regarded as imper-
missible sex discrimination because only women are given in-
formation about reproductive risks associated with their
employment while men are given no such information. 173
Technically, any difference in the warnings given women
and men could be regarded as a violation of Title VII because
women and men are treated differently. 74 Moreover, common
sense and simple honesty demand that an employer give
accurate information about risks to employees even if what is
known differs for women and men. Literal compliance with
Title VII might be achieved by giving all employees the same
comprehensive explanation of risks which will inform both
women and men of the risks for each sex. Requiring employers
to give all employees information about the risks for both
sexes not only ensures formally equal treatment, it is also
desirable from a policy perspective because knowledge about
risks routinely ran by other employees might be relevant to
the decisionmaking processes of some employees considering
whether to take a hazardous job. Thus, employers like Johnson
169. Id.; see also OBrien et al., supra note 147, at 149-53 (detailing the warnings
given by Johnson Controls that did not address the issue of paternal reproductive
hazards).
170. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 191.
171. Id.
172. See Peter T. Kilborn, Employers Left With Many Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
20, 1991, at B12 (quoting a Johnson Controls spokesperson who stated that, in light
of the Court's decision, the company would consider returning to its previous prac-
tice of warning women of job-related fetal risks and allowing each woman to decide
what was in her best interests).
173. Cf. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197-200 (holding that Johnson Controls'
sex-specific fetal protection policy was impermissible under Title VII because it ap-
plied differently to the reproductive capacities of male and female employees).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988); see also O'rien et al., supra note 147, at 154
(summarizing the plaintiffs' argument in Johnson Controls that the fetal protection
policy was "underinclusive because it neglected to protect male employees and their
offspring").
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Controls should be required to give both women and men
information about the risks associated with both paternal and
maternal exposure.
Employers may desire to give employees who wish to have
children in the near future certain options to minimize
reproductive risk during a particularly important time, such as
a temporary transfer to a low-risk area at full pay and without
any loss of seniority.'75 When scientific evidence suggests
significant risks associated with both paternal and maternal
employment near the time of conception, temporary job options
should be offered to fertile men wanting to become parents as
well as to women, before and during pregnancy.176 Such
conduct would not constitute a violation of Title VII.
For some hazards, however, what is known of relative
risks might support offering such options only to one sex.
Would an employer offering such options only to fertile or
pregnant women violate Title VII in light of Johnson Controls?
If supported by appropriate scientific evidence of differential
risks, it should be permissible for an employer to make options
available only to pregnant women or to women wanting to
become pregnant. For example, a court reviewing a hospital's
policy that offers pregnant nurses reassignment to avoid
exposure to illnesses known to be hazardous during pregnancy
should view the policy as nondiscriminatory, permissible either
as affirmative action 177 or under the holding in California
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra.78 In Cal Fed,
175. See, e.g., 29 C.F.IR § 1604.10 (1993) (requiring employers to treat employees
temporarily unable to perform their job functions because of pregnancy related condi-
tions as they do other temporarily disabled workers, by giving them modified tasks,
alternative assignments, or disability leaves with or without pay); Hayes v. Shelby
Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1984) (requiring an employer to
utilize the least discriminatory means available to accomplish fetal protection goals,
including offering pregnant employees temporary reassignments when feasible);
Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992-94 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the
employer's refusal to apply its standard policy granting temporary disability leave
with guaranteed reinstatement to a pregnant X-ray technician and instead requiring
her resignation as the best alternative with the least discriminatory impact).
176. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197
(1991), (suggesting that Title VII requires that both women and men be provided
equal choices as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health).
177. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626-41 (1987)
(stating that the existence of an affirmation action plan is a legitimate, non-discrim-
inatory reason that rebuts a prima facie case of reverse sex discrimination, and con-
cluding that an employee's sex is one factor that may be taken into account); see
also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-07 (1979) (concluding that
Congress did not intend "to limit traditional business freedom" so as to preclude,
under Title VII, voluntary employment policies designed to correct racial imbalances).
178. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
[Vol. 31:43
1994] REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS 75
the Supreme Court upheld, against a Title VII challenge, a
California law requiring employers to give only workers
disabled by pregnancy the option of an unpaid leave of up to
four months.'79 Title VII preempts inconsistent state law, so
the validity of California's law depended on the Court's
determination that the law did not conflict with the mandates
of Title VII.' ° The Supreme Court upheld the California rule
on the ground "that Congress intended the PDA to be 'a floor
beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not
a ceiling above which they may not rise.'"1' The Court
stressed that Congress was concerned about discrimination
against pregnant workers, not with banning "preferential
treatment of pregnancy."8 2
Thus, an employer could give additional options to
pregnant workers or to those trying to become pregnant
without violating Title VII, as long as those options do not
discriminate against fertile or pregnant women.' 3 Thus, an
employer could offer such employees temporary transfers to
low risk areas or special safety gear, at least in the absence of
evidence that men trying to have children face similar risks
and therefore should have similar options. Some of the
language in Cal Fed appears to support an employer making
options available only to women even when men face similar
risks,"s but on a common sense level it seems quite likely
that a court would view such a policy as impermissibly
discriminating against similarly-situated men.8
5
179. Id. at 280.
180. Id. at 292.
181. Id. at 285.
182. See Cal Fed, 479 U.S. at 285-88 (discussing the PDA's underlying legislative
intent and noting that had Congress intended to prohibit preferential treatment, it
would have so stated rather than merely mentioning that the PDA does not require
employers to extend preferential treatment to pregnant employees).
183. See id.; see also Kelber v. Forest Elec. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326, 335
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that Johnson Controls will allow employers to offer less
onerous jobs to pregnant women who are incapable of performing more difficult jobs,
and concluding that nothing in Johnson Controls justifies an employer's refusal to
accommodate a pregnant employee's physical limitations).
184. See Cal Fed, 479 U.S. at 285 (quoting the appellate court's conclusion that
Congress intended the PDA to be "a floor beneath which pregnancy disability bene-
fits may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise"). But see id. at 297-
98 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title VII prohibits all unequal treatment,
including the preferential treatment provided to pregnant employees under the Cali-
fornia statute).
185. In one sense, the California statute at issue in Cal Fed discriminated
against similarly situated men, i.e., men who were temporarily disabled but not
given disability leave under the statute. See Cal Fed, 479 U.S. at 279 (quoting the
trial court's opinion in Cal Fed and discussing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983) (ruling that federal law preempted the
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The third distinction employers might want to make is
distinguishing between pregnant and non-pregnant workers
under circumstances such that the employer's distinction
appears to be discrimination against pregnant workers. Under
Johnson Controls, fertile women cannot be treated differently
from other workers in the absence of potentially ruinous tort
liability'"-and whether the Court would recognize a BFOQ
defense even in that extreme situation is far from clear.'
8 7
But what if an employer policy transfers pregnant workers
against their will to low-risk positions or fires them in the
name of fetal safety?
The reasoning of Johnson Controls seems to address this
situation. The employer policy transferring or discharging a
pregnant employee against her will overtly discriminates on
the basis of sex under the PDA."s Therefore, such a policy
can be upheld only if based on a BFOQ defense,'8 9 but that
defense is not available simply because of an employer's moral
or ethical concern for the welfare of the next generation or
because of fear of tort liability. On the first point, the Court
indicated that parents, rather than employers, were the
appropriate decisionmakers under the PDA."9 On the second
point, the Court indicated that only the prospect of cat-
astrophic tort liability might suffice as the basis for such a
cost-based BFOQ defense.' 9 ' It is of course possible that the
state's four-month leave statute because it discriminated in reverse against male
employees temporarily disabled who would not receive the pregnancy disability
leave)). But disabled male employees are not necessarily the most relevant similarly
situated men. Rather, men becoming fathers, i.e., those whose wives are pregnant,
are arguably a more relevant comparison group. These men are not similarly-situ-
ated with their pregnant women co-workers in terms of needing disability leave in
order to combine work and reproduction.
186. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210-11.
187. See id. at 200, 206 (holding that an employer can implement a fetal protec-
tion policy only if it shows that gender is a BFOQ, but finding that Johnson Con-
trols did not support its claimed BFOQ defense); id. at 210 (stating that the in-
creased costs of employing women due to potential tort liability cannot support a
BFOQ defense for an exclusionary job policy unless the potential costs are cata-
strophic to the employer's business); refer to notes 183-86 supra and accompanying
text.
188. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2(a) (1988) (making it unlawful to dis-
charge an employee on the basis of gender); Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210
(holding that Title VII forbids sex-specific fetal protection policies).
189. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 200.
190. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206-07 (rejecting the employer's concerns
that were unrelated to women's performance of the essence of the employer's busi-
ness as the basis for a BFOQ defense). Refer to note 147 supra and accompanying
text, explaining that while reproductive decisions remain with the mother, an em-
ployer retains a duty to provide a safe workplace.
191. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210 (holding that Johnson Controls did
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Court will conclude differently in a case actually involving em-
ployer-imposed limits on the employment opportunities of only
pregnant women, at least when supported by scientific
evidence of risk. But such a result would be inconsistent with
the logic of Johnson Controls and its sound policy analysis.
From a policy perspective, there are two difficulties with
allowing employers to limit the employment opportunities of
only pregnant workers, either by firing them or involuntarily
transferring them out of high-risk jobs. First, if only pregnant
women face limited employment opportunities for the sake of
their offspring, we cannot be sure that the distinction is not
based on sex, i.e., that the employer would be equally willing,
on a similar showing of possible harm, to restrict the em-
ployment opportunities of male workers.'92 We have a long
tradition of regarding women's needs as subordinate to those
of their children, while according men's needs full respect and
recognition because only men seem to be independent human
beings.9o
The second problem with allowing employers to fire
pregnant workers for the welfare of their children is that if
pregnant workers are viewed as economic actors, we cannot be
sure that limiting their employment opportunities is in the
best interest of their children, born and unborn. When an
employer fires a pregnant worker in the name of fetal health,
her child may well be born without adequate, or any, health
insurance and without the economic resources necessary for a
good start on life.
Both these problems-the strong possibility that but for
the pregnant workers' sex their employment opportunities
would not be limited, and the possibility that job limitations
may actually harm these workers' born and unborn
children-are exacerbated by the fact that pregnant workers
are often marginal workers, i.e., workers employers would
not present evidence of ruinous tort liability associated with employing women to
support a cost-based BFOQ defense, and stating that the "incremental cost of hiring
women" cannot excuse a discriminatory employment policy).
192. Refer to notes 48-59, 99-104 supra and accompanying text; see also Reva
Siegal, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. Rev. 261, 266 (1992) (commenting that
gender-based social judgments about narrative roles continue to play a large part in
decision-making).
193. Refer to notes 105-09 supra and accompanying text; see also MacKinnon, su-
pra note 105, at 1281-84 (analyzing the history of women's rights and historical
perceptions of women's roles as less than citizens with full rights in the United
States); Siegel, supra note 192, at 280-304 (discussing the 19th century anti-abortion
movement in terms of traditional value judgments commonly made concerning
women's roles).
19941
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happily replace. Pregnant workers are likely to be marginal
workers because of the added costs so often associated with
continued employment, including the costs of temporary
replacement personnel at and after childbirth; additional medi-
cal costs, particularly in the common situation where an
employer's premiums depend on employees' claims; and
additional costs for covering the duties of a worker returning
to work after childbirth but needing time off to care for a sick
infant.
Congress passed the PDA, in part, because many
employers regarded pregnant workers as so marginal as to
warrant dismissal."94  Allowing employers to force these
vulnerable workers to take unattractive'95 temporary assign-
ments during pregnancy gives employers the power to try,
subtly or not so subtly, to force pregnant workers to resign
rather than face a temporary reassignment so unattractive
that they would prefer unemployment." To keep employers
honest in the sense of offering pregnant workers attractive
temporary transfers to low-risk areas, employers should be
allowed to give options to pregnant workers but not to force
them to take temporary positions they do not want. Most
pregnant workers are, of course, quite concerned about fetal
health and will be eager to take temporary transfers to low
risk jobs provided there is no significant loss of seniority, pay,
or benefits. When a pregnant employee is forced to accept such
a loss, she may well be right in thinking that the temporary
transfer is not in her interest, nor in the interests of her living
children or unborn child.'97
As noted earlier, two federal courts of appeal have
considered cases in which hospitals fired pregnant X-ray
technicians, and both found that the employer had violated Ti-
tle VII."' In both cases, however, the courts stressed the
availability of less restrictive alternatives such as temporary
194. See Becker, supra note 62, at 1254.
195. 'Unattractive" is used in the sense that the women themselves did not re-
quest or agree to transfers.
196. See Kelber v. Forest Elec. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(stating that, even after Johnson Controls, an employer cannot justify deliberately
assigning a pregnant employee to tasks which she should not, or is unable to, per-
form and concluding that failure to accommodate a pregnant employee's physical
limitations may be viewed as intentional discrimination).
197. Refer to notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
undesirable economic effects on women employees and their children that often ac-
company exclusionary fetal protection policies.
198. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1984);
Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992-94 (5th Cir. 1982); refer to notes
11-18 supra and accompanying text.
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transfers to low-risk areas or reassignment of duties within a
department to minimize harmful exposure during
pregnancy." Neither court considered or discussed a
situation in which an employer forced a pregnant worker to
accept a transfer or reassignment she considered un-
desirable.2 "° Despite the broad language of Johnson Controls,
we cannot be sure how the Supreme Court would respond to
such policies, particularly if pay was not drastically cut nor
benefits curtailed. Requiring employers to offer pregnant
workers alternative employment options, rather than allowing
them to mandate "special" terms of employment would both
ensure that employers offer pregnant workers attractive
options, likely to be in the best interest of the workers and
their children, and would also preclude restrictions on the
employment opportunities of women that the employer would
not impose on men facing similar reproductive risks.
IV. REMAINING PROBLEMS
A. Problems for Employees
Employees of both genders need adequate warning of
reproductive hazards so that they can make fully informed
decisions about hazardous employment. Employees also need
safer workplaces and accommodation of their needs during
periods of unusual vulnerability to reproductive hazards.
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),
employers are already required to warn employees of health
hazards, including reproductive risk.20' Unfortunately, OSHA
is poorly enforced2 and employers typically ignore the duty
to warn because every incentive cuts in favor of their si-
lence. °3 Disclosure might encourage employees to require
199. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1551, 1553-54 (stressing the hospital's duty to explore
the possible reassignment of the pregnant X-ray technician to another capacity in
the radiology department before claiming that her discharge was a business neces-
sity); Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 992-93 (holding that the employer hospital did not at-
tempt to locate a replacement technician for the pregnant worker's position, and that
the availability of this less restrictive alternative to discharge illustrated that the
discharge for pregnancy was a pretext for sex discrimination).
200. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1545-46 (addressing whether under the PDA an em-
ployer can discharge a pregnant worker to protect her fetus); Zuniga, 692 F.2d at
987 (same).
201. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.96(i), 1910.1017(j), 1910.1025(l) (1993) (stating
the disclosure requirements for ionizing radiation, vinyl chloride, and lead).
202. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Reforming OSHA: Some Thoughts for the
Current Legislative Agenda, 31 Hous. L. R~v. 99 (1994).
203. Refer to notes 256-57 infra and accompanying text for reasons why employ-
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more in the way of compensation or to demand a safer
workplace. In addition, if the employee or the employee's
spouse or child at risk through the employee develops an
illness or condition that might be linked to the employee's
workplace exposure, prior notification of workplace risks will
increase the likelihood that the employee will recognize the
link to workplace exposure and will file a workers'
compensation or tort claim. Given these powerful disincentives
to full disclosure of risks to employees, greater OSHA en-
forcement of the duty to warn is needed. Perhaps individual
workers should be given a private right of action to seek
damages or to recover a fine in the event their employer does
not adequately warn of known health risks including
reproductive hazards.
Employees also need safer workplaces to the extent
feasible. 2' Fetal safety and reproductive health cannot be
achieved by excluding all women who cannot show sterility
from jobs involving exposure to hazardous substances, as the
failure of the Johnson Controls policy proves. 5 Indeed, one
risk of fetal vulnerability policies is that decisionmakers will
focus only on eliminating risks to future children associated
with exposure of fertile women and fail to eliminate far
greater risks actually present to living workers and the
children of male workers. This point is illustrated by Johnson
Controls. That policy excluded all women who could not show
sterility from lead exposure on the factory floor but gave male
workers no information about reproductive risk' nor any
ability to lower them by temporary transfers during periods
when the men and their wives were trying to conceive. 207
And, of course, lead is harmful to all human life, including
ers prefer to remain silent.
204. See REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 46, at 31-32 (arguing that
a serious commitment by employers and government to the protection of the repro-
ductive health of both female and male workers is absolutely necessary to guard the
health of both individual workers and future generations).
205. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 192
(1991).
206. I& at 208.
207. See id. at 192 (stating that one male employee had been denied a request
for a leave of absence for the purpose of lowering his lead level because he intended
to become a father); see also id. at 198 (noting that evidence in the court record
demonstrated the "debilitating effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive sys-
tem"); REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 46, at 69-70 (citing several stud-
ies that reported many abnormalities to the male reproductive system after exposure
to lead including subnormal sperm counts, azoospermia, low sperm motility, poor or
absent erection, premature ejaculation, lower chromosome stability, and lowered se-
cretory function).
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living workers. At the conference for this Symposium, a
number of experts in occupational health indicated that many
employers responded to the Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson Controls by making their workplaces safer.2"
Finally, employees need accommodation to lower
reproductive risk at certain periods of heightened vulnerability,
such as during pregnancy or while the female worker or male
worker's partner is trying to conceive.2°  Armstrong v.
Flowers Hospital, Inc.21° is illustrative of this need. In this
case, the plaintiff, Pamela Armstrong, was a nurse working for
a hospital that provided home services to patients. 211 During
her pregnancy, her employer assigned Armstrong to a patient
with cryptococcal meningitis, an infectious and serious illness
common among AIDS patients.212 AIDS patients tend to
suffer from a number of opportunistic infections likely to be
more dangerous to a child in utero than to a healthy
adult.213 Armstrong told her supervisor that because she was
in the first trimester of pregnancy she should not treat the pa-
tient.214  Her supervisor informed her that the hospital's
policy was not to reassign nurses on the basis of unusual
risks,2 15  and Armstrong was given two days to decide
whether to treat the patient or lose her job.216
Armstrong refused to treat the patient and was fired.217
Eventually, she lost her medical insurance as well.218
208. New Challenges in Occupational Health Symposium, Houston, TX, Mar. 4-5,
1993 (organized by the University of Houston Health Law & Policy Institute).
209. Cf. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553-54 (11th Cir.
1984) (holding that the employee successfully rebutted employer's business necessity
defense by showing that employer did not consider alternative duties for the employ-
ee that would provide the dual purpose of minimizing danger to the fetus and being
less discriminatory towards the employee); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d
986, 992-94 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that an employer should consider hiring a tem-
porary replacement for a pregnant worker rather than permanently discharging her).
210. 812 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
211. Id at 1185.
212. Id. at 1186.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. Id. The employing hospital apparently had a policy to reassign pregnant
workers within the hospital so that they did not treat patients in "isolation." Id.
Some dispute existed as to whether the AIDS patient assigned to Armstrong for
home care was an "isolation" patient. Id
216. Id
217. Id
218. See id at 1187 (noting that Armstrong maintained medical insurance cover-
age pursuant to COBRA at a greatly increased cost for as long as she was able).
Because her pregnancy was a preexisting condition, she was unable to procure insur-
ance elsewhere. Id. Refer to note 97 supra for a description of the function and
availability of COBRA benefits for terminated employees.
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Although her husband had insurance, this coverage did not in-
clude family coverage for pregnancy or childbirth.219 Because
of the hospital's failure to accommodate Armstrong's
heightened vulnerability during pregnancy,22 ° her child was
born without medical insurance.
221
Armstrong sued her employer under Title VII, alleging
"that the defendant discriminated against her based upon her
pregnancy when it required her to treat an AIDS patient or be
subject to termination."2 22 She alleged discrimination under
both the disparate treatment and disparate impact models.2
The district court dismissed the disparate treatment claim
because, in fact, her employer had not treated pregnant nurses
differently from non-pregnant nurses: nurses in both categories
were required to treat patients assigned to them.2 2 4 This
portion of the court's opinion makes perfect sense.
22
The district court also dismissed Armstrong's claim that
the employer's failure to accommodate pregnant workers by
reassigning them violated Title VII because of its disparate
impact on pregnant workers.226 This part of the decision is
more problematic. The district court admitted that the
employer's failure to treat pregnant workers differently had an
adverse impact on pregnant workers, but regarded this causal
link as insufficient to create "a prima facie case of disparate
impact pregnancy discrimination" because the actual,
intervening cause for Armstrong's discharge was her refusal to
do her job. 7  The employer noted that courts had not
extended the PDA to require that employers take affirmative
steps to accommodate pregnant workers, and cited Johnson
219. Armstrong, 812 F. Supp. at 1187.
220. Not only would an infection be more serious during pregnancy, but there
was also evidence that Armstrong was more likely to sustain an infection during
pregnancy because she suffered from gestational diabetes. Id. at 1186. During preg-
nancy, her immune system would be weakened and more vulnerable to opportunistic
infections. Id
221. See id. at 1187 (summarizing circumstances due to Armstrong's discharge
that left her without comprehensive medical insurance coverage for her pregnancy
and the birth of her baby).
222. Id at 1188.
223. Id. at 1189-90. Refer to notes 21-28 supra and accompanying text for a re-
view of these two primary methods of claiming and proving employment discrimina-
tion.
224. Armstrong, 812 F. Supp. at 1190.
225. In fact, Armstrong's claim was that her employer's failure to treat pregnant
nurses differently violated Title VII. Id at 1190 n.10. But see id. at 1191 (noting
that Title VII's purpose was not to require accommodation of pregnant employees
rising to the level of preferential treatment).
226. Id. at 1191.
227. Id.
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Controls for the proposition that "it is the woman's decision to
make as to whether or not to subject the fetus to harm."228
Johnson Controls does indeed support the point that the
decision should be Armstrong's.229 However, had Armstrong's
employer offered home health care nurses safer options, such
as reassignment during pregnancy, as it did for pregnant
nurses caring for "isolation" patients in the hospital, the de-
cision about her child's safety would still have been
Armstrong's to makeY Indeed, she would have been able to
make a better decision because more options would have been
available to her.
It is true that federal courts have not required employers
to accommodate the needs of pregnant workers in enforcing
the PDA." I A duty to accommodate is, however, regarded as
part of the duty not to discriminate in two other contexts:
religion under Title VII;1 2  and disability under the
Americans with Disability Act of 1990 (ADA).2 3 A failure to
accommodate in a case like Armstrong could similarly be seen
as discrimination, especially under the disparate impact mod-
elY That courts have not as yet recognized this as actionable
228. Id at 1192. This position allowed the court to find that Title VII is not
implicated when a pregnant woman must decide whether to perform her job and
risk her baby's safety or to refuse to do her job. Id. at 1191. This reasoning led to
the conclusion that the plaintiff's decision, rather than that of her employer, was
responsible for termination of her job. Id.
229. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206
(1991) (determining that it is parents and not employers who should make decisions
concerning future children's welfare and that Congress intended that the PDA place
fetal safety concerns with the family).
230. Armstrong, 812 F. Supp. at 1186. Refer to note 215 supra for a description
of the hospital's policy of reassigning pregnant nurses from treatment of "isolation"
hospital patients, which was apparently considered inapplicable to the nurses pro-
viding home health care.
231. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210 (noting that Congress intentionally
declined to require preferential treatment of pregnant workers when it passed the
PDA); Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 n.14 (1983) (reject-
ing the argument that the PDA requires special treatment of pregnancy in order to
fulfill the general policies of Title VII). But see Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726
F.2d 1543, 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that the defendant hospital had failed
to consider the less discriminatory alternative of temporary reassignment for the
plaintiff and instead illegally fired her upon learning of her pregnancy); Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 (4th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the business neces-
sity defense may be rebutted by evidence showing that policies other than discharge
are available to the employer); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992-
94 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that the hospital's business necessity defense failed be-
cause it did not attempt to provide the pregnant plaintiff with a leave of absence,
an available and less discriminatory means of protecting her fetus).
232. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (1988).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bXS)(A) (Supp. I1 1991).
234. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1553-54 (discussing the possibility of an employer
finding the business necessity defense unavailable to him, when faced with a dispa-
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discrimination reflects in part the fact that prior to the 1989
Supreme Court case of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,25
many courts regarded the disparate impact model as available
to challenge only tests and other objective employment cri-
terion such as educational requirements.' These courts did
not consider that the disparate impact theory could be used to
challenge workplace rules like that at issue in Armstrong."
In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court recognized that the
disparate impact model is broadly available to challenge em-
ployment practices other than tests and objective requirements,
such as hiring through certain networks for some jobs and
other networks for other jobs, that nonetheless have an ad-
verse impact on the employment opportunities of a protected
class.' The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title
VII, codified and perhaps expanded this interpretation of Title
VIIY 9 It clearly indicates that the disparate impact model
can be used to challenge "a particular employment practice" or
rate impact claim for firing a pregnant worker, due to the fact that other alterna-
tives would allow him to accommodate her pregnancy); Wright, 697 F.2d at 1191
(same); Zuniga, 692 F.2d at 992-94 (same).
235. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
236. In this racial discrimination case, the Wards Cove Court entertained a dis-
parate impact challenge to the employer's subjective hiring decisions, although the
plaintiffs did not prevail on the merits. Id. at 647, 675.
237. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 797 (5th Cir.
1986) (holding that only the disparate treatment model is available to a plaintiff
challenging a discretionary promotion system), vacated, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Lewis v.
NLRB, 750 F.2d. 1266, 1271 n.3 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that the use of subjective
criteria to evaluate employees in hiring is analyzed, "not under the disparate impact
model, but instead under the disparate treatment model") (quoting Walls v. Missis-
sippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 730 F.2d 306, 321 (5th Cir. 1984)); Carroll v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the disparate
impact model did not apply to subjective criteria used to evaluate employees in hir-
ing and job placement decisions); Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609, 611 (8th
Cir. 1981) (holding that subjective decision-making practices of an employer "cannot
alone form the foundation for a discriminatory impact case"). A split of authority
existed on this point until the United States Supreme Court resolved it in Watson.
487 U.S. at 989-90 (ruling that an employer's subjective hiring, firing, and promotion
policies may form the basis for a disparate impact case). The Ninth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits had earlier held that subjective practices alone could support a dispa-
rate impact case. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1480-86
(9th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (allowing the use of discretionary or subjective criteria as a
basis for a disparate impact case), rev'd on other grounds, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Grif-
fin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1522-25 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that a disparate im-
pact challenge to an employer's subjective selection procedures is allowable); Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that an employer's subjective
judgments as to work assignments, supervisory evaluations, disciplinary procedures,
and promotion processes are subject to challenge under a disparate impact theory),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
238. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
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even an employer's "decisionmaking process" if that process
can not be broken down into particular practices with a
demonstrable disparate impact on a protected group. 240
An employer practice, like that challenged in Armstrong, of
refusing to accommodate health care workers especially
vulnerable to reproductive hazards has a clear disparate
impact on pregnant workers.24' Such a practice should be
permitted only if the employer is able to show the requisite
business necessity.142 True, courts have not yet recognized
that failure to accommodate pregnant workers' needs is a Title
VII violation, but such a finding would be consistent with
general disparate impact notions under Wards Cove and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.243 Nor should courts require
240. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (allowing plaintiffs to make a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that an employer's practices cause an adverse disparate
impact on a protected category); id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (requiring plaintiffs to iden-
tify each specific employment practice causing a disparate impact, except if the var-
ious aspects of the employer's decisionmaking process having an adverse result for a
protected category is not capable of separation).
241. Such a policy of refusing to reassign or otherwise accommodate employees
concerned about reproductive hazards, although neutral on its face, will adversely
affect the population of health care workers who are pregnant. Refer to notes 26-28
supra and accompanying text (discussing the disparate impact model).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1991) (stating that a plaintiff
can establish an unlawful employment practice due to its disparate impact on a
category of persons protected under Title VII only if the plaintiff identifies a particu-
lar practice having an adverse impact and the employer cannot demonstrate "that
the challenged practice is job related" and a "business necessity").
Case law has yet to flesh out the meaning of the term business necessity"
when the challenge is to a decisionmaking process or other employment practice
unrelated to tests and objective employment criteria such as educational require-
ments. Presumably, in a situation like that in Armstrong, the employer would have
to show that because of its small scope of operations, economic hardship, or other
circumstances, it could not, without undue burden to its business, accommodate the
needs of nurses like Pamela Armstrong through special assignments. This business
necessity and undue hardship defense would be analogous to the limits on the duty
of accommodation under the ADA and the religious discrimination provision of Title
VII. See id. § 12112(bX5XA) (requiring employers to make reasonable accommoda-
tions for otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities up until the point when
accommodation poses an undue hardship on the operation of an employer's business);
id. § 2000e6j) (1988) (requiring same as to the duty of employers to accommodate
employees' religious observation and practice).
243. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658 (1989). The fact
that employers must use employment practices having a less discriminatory impact
suggests a duty to reasonably accommodate, for example, pregnant women, just as
employers accommodate other temporarily disabled workers. See S. REP. No. 331,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) (stating that the PDA would require employers who
provide a general support program for its temporarily disabled workers to provide
the same benefits to women temporarily disabled by pregnancy or childbirth), re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4752; H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1978) (stating that workers temporarily disabled by pregnancy must receive the
same benefits as other disabled workers), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753.
But see Kelber v. Forest Elec. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (dis-
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empirical evidence that failure to accommodate reproductive
needs has a statistically significant disparate impact. Such a
showing should be assumed as long as there is evidence that
pregnancy poses an unusual level of reproductive risk. An
additional requirement of empirical and statistically significant
proof is likely to pose an arbitrary hurdle for employees in
small workforces, where statistical significance with respect to
a sub-class of only pregnant employees is likely to be difficult
or impossible to establish, though common sense indicates such
an impact will inevitably be present.
A requirement that employers accommodate pregnant
workers' needs in light of reproductive hazards might be
required under either the ADA or the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).2 4 The ADA offers an employee
the right remedy-a duty on employers to accommodate.
24 5
But the employee seeking to use it to minimize fetal hazards
while continuing to work will face a serious obstacle in the
EEOC guidelines on the ADA, which explicitly exclude
pregnancy from the Act's scope.246  Congress could easily
amend the ADA to require that employers offer reasonable
accommodation to employees trying to become parents in light
of reproductive risks, just as reasonable accommodation is
required for other physical conditions and disabilities.
247
On the other hand, while the F1LA arguably covers
pregnancy, it provides the wrong remedy.2' It only affords
an employee who needs time off to care for another in her or
his immediate family-which arguably might include safety for
missing the disparate impact claim of a pregnant worker whose employer did not
accommodate pregnancy-related needs because she failed to demonstrate that a spe-
cific employment practice had a statistically significant disparate impact on pregnant
women).
244. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601,
2611-19, 2631-36, 2651-54; 5 U.S.C. §§ 2105, 6381-87).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5)(A) (Supp. 111 1991).
246. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app., § 1630.2(h), at 402 (1993) (distinguishing preg-
nancy from the conditions protected by the ADA as a result of physical or mental
impairment).
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1991) (listing the types of accom-
modation required of employers with employees who are otherwise qualified individu-
als with a disability).
248. Leave for protection of a worker's fetus appears to fall within FMLA's
statutory definitions of purposes for which leave may be taken. Under the FMLA,
leave is available "[i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of
the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condi-
tion" or "[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to
perform the functions of the position of such employee." FMLA § 102(a)(1XC)-(D),
107 Stat. 9 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C)-(D)). Neither provision actual-
ly describes a pregnant woman, but either could be read as extending to cover her.
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a child in utero-three months unpaid leave from the job.249
Assuming the FMLA makes leave available to pregnant
workers like Pamela Armstrong, she needs accommodation
during pregnancy, not time off without pay, so that she can
keep working without undue risk to her child.20 Three
months leave is too short a time for a woman to successfully
protect her fetus from the many hazards posing risks
throughout gestation25 and total leave, rather than a job
reassignment, is too much time off given her need for
income.Y52 In addition, if she were to take three months
FMLA leave to minimize fetal exposure to a hazard especially
dangerous during, for example the first trimester, that leave
would limit her ability to take another leave she may want
and need when her child is born, because a three-month leave
under FMLA is available only once during a twelve-month
periodY
Employees may also be able to use tort law to establish a
duty on the part of employers to accommodate employees'
needs for reproductive safety during periods of special vulnera-
bility. For example, in a recent federal case, the plaintiff
alleged not only a Title VII violation because her employer
failed to accommodate her needs while pregnant, but also that
the failure to accommodate was an intentional infliction of
emotional distress and a prima facie tort.2 Although
employers' limitations on the employment opportunities of
pregnant or fertile women should not be regarded as violating
Title VII, it does not follow that employers should not be liable
in tort when they fail to offer pregnant workers options which
will eliminate or significantly lower fetal risk without
unreasonable cost. The welfare of the next generation will be
maximized by requiring such accommodation under both Title
VII and state tort law.2 5' Employers may, of course, face
249. Id. § 102(aX1) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)).
250. The economic harm to the family of a pregnant worker on unpaid leave is
nearly as disastrous as outright discharge because often such an employee is respon-
sible for the support of herself and other children. Refer to notes 96-98 supra and
accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 46, at 650-51 (stating
that there is a high rate of embryonic loss during the first 60 days of gestation and
that toxins can alter or kill the growth of the embryo). The embryonic period is the
first three weeks to eight or nine weeks of pregnancy. Id at 49.
252. Refer to notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text.
253. FMLA § 102(a)(1), 107 Stat. 9 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)).
254. Kelber v. Forest Elec. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326, 330, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
255. Indeed, there are other situations in which tort liability reinforces the ob-
jectives of Title VII and other status protection statutes. See, e.g., Wilson v. Monarch
Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1140.41 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding the employer liable under
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conflicts between Title VII and tort liability, the subject of the
next section, but accommodating the needs of pregnant
workers does not raise such a conflict.
B. Remaining Problems for Employers
In Johnson Controls and elsewhere, employers have
justified limiting pregnant or fertile workers' employment
opportunities on the ground that their employment might lead
to tort liability for the employer.2" Particularly in light of
Johnson Controls, employers may be caught between a rock,
the need to avoid Title VII liability by keeping jobs open to
women regardless of reproductive risks, and a hard place, the
need to avoid costly tort liability. 7 However, an employer
can effectively limit this conflict. First, by offering those
workers who pose particularly high reproductive risks, typically
pregnant workers or all workers trying to become parents,
both the ADEA and in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress for dramat-
ic demotion and humiliation of a 60-year-old vice president reduced to providing
cafeteria janitorial services to former subordinates); Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d
711, 712 (Tex. 1991) (finding the employer liable, under state tort law for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, to a secretary forced to quit her job because of sexu-
al harassment by her supervisor).
256. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 209
(1991) (noting that although Johnson Controls did not assert potential tort liability
costs as a reason for its exclusionary policy toward non-sterile female workers, the
prospect of liability was a primary factor behind the policy); Hayes v. Shelby Memo-
rial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 n.15 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting the defendant
hospital's attempted defense to a claim by a discharged pregnant worker that its
policy's goal was to avoid litigation costs and potential lawsuits by a hospital em-
ployee or her child); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 n.26 (4th Cir. 1982)
(citing City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-
17 (1978)) (deciding that fetal protection policies adopted only to avoid potential
liability and resulting economic loss are insufficient to establish a business necessity
defense); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating
that the plaintiff's supervisor based his decision to fire the plaintiff solely on his
fear of a lawsuit against the hospital by the plaintiff's future child).
257. Concurring Justice White, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy joined, was acutely aware of this conflict. In Johnson Controls, he discussed
an employer's need to avoid tort liability as part of any cost containment plan.
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 212-19 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). Justice White argued, on three grounds, that the BFOQ defense
should be construed broadly enough to encompass "considerations of cost and safety
of the sort that could form the basis for an employer's adoption of a fetal protection
policy." Id. at 215. First, it is currently unclear "that compliance with Title VII will
pre-empt state tort liability." Id. at 213. Second, warning employees of fetal danger
will not protect an employer from suit by a worker's child, because a parent general-
ly cannot waive his or her child's causes of action. Id- Third, although an injured
child's state tort suit will be brought under a negligence theory, employers are un-
able to determine in advance what standards prove lack of negligence (especially
because compliance with OSHA standards is not always a defense to tort liability).
Id at 213-14.
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special options accommodating their needs with temporary
transfer, the employer can limit potential tort liability without
violating Title VII' Second, an employer could allow only
sterile people to hold certain jobs, thus ensuring zero repro-
ductive risk without discriminating on the basis of sex or
pregnancy, again without violating Title VIIY"
In considering the potential conflict an employer faces
between Title VII and tort liability, one additional major point
must be made: the conflict is entirely theoretical. No known
cases exist in which substances or activities regarded as fetal
hazards-and the subject of fetal vulnerability policies in any
workplace or likely ever to be the subject of such
policies-have lead to employer liability as a result of maternal
or paternal exposure.
To be sure, some cases have involved allegations of fetal
injuries due to maternal employment, but in these cases the
injuries were, according to the allegations of the complaints,
the result of accidents or an employer's failure to accommodate
the needs of a pregnant woman by varying routine workplace
practices.' Only one case, Security National Bank v.
258. Refer to notes 175-76 supra and accompanying text. Johnson Controls pre-
vents an employer from mandating discharge or reassignment of employees due to
pregnancy or related conditions. 499 U.S. at 210 (citing the PDA and Arizona Gov-
erning Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 n.14 (1983)). However, nothing in the
PDA or case law prevents an employer from offering alternative assignments to
workers who may be seeking a means to lower reproductive risk in anticipation of
having a child. Refer to note 177 supra and accompanying text.
259. Neither Title VII generally nor the PDA specifically prohibits employment
practices that discriminate on the basis of fertility. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988)
(holding employment practices that discriminate on the basis of sex to be unlawful);
ic. § 2000e(k) (explaining that prohibited sex discrimination includes discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy, child birth, and related medical conditions).
260. See Kelber v. Forest Elec. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 326, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(concerning tort claims as well as claims under Title VII for the death of the fetus
of plaintiff, an electrician, whose employer transferred her from a heated indoor job
to an outdoor job early in pregnancy); Thompson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 767 F.
Supp. 916, 917-18 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that state workers' compensation scheme
did not preclude a tort action to recover for injuries suffered in utero by son of Piz-
za Hut employee for injuries allegedly incurred when the mother was exposed to
carbon monoxide fumes at work); Bell v. Macy's Cal., 261 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453 (Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that the California workers' compensation scheme provided the
exclusive remedy for injuries allegedly caused by medical malpractice in treatment of
the mother during her seventh month of pregnancy at the employer's on-site clinic);
Keefe v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., No. 91 A2005, 1993 WL 17698, at *2-3 (Colo. Ct.
App. Jan. 28, 1993) (not released for publication) (holding that a tort claim could be
brought for alleged prenatal injury to a child as a result of maternal employment
when the pregnant worker informed her employer of doctor-imposed limitations on
her work, but the employer refused to honor them); Globe Sec. v. Pringle, 559 So.
2d 720, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding employer liable under workers' com-
pensation system for medical expenses associated with pregnancy-related complica-
tions caused by an industrial accident); Cushing v. Time Saver Stores, Inc., 552 So.
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Chloride, Inc.,2 1 involved an injury connected to the kind of
recognized fetal hazard that has ever lead to, or would be
likely to lead to, a fetal vulnerability policy excluding all
fertile or pregnant women from jobs. In that case, the district
court affirmed the jury's decision in favor of the employer, a
decision apparently based on a lack of causation, although
there was evidence that the employer had violated OSHA's
general lead standard.2
Unless the fetal hazard causes unique injuries clearly
identifiable as associated with a particular hazard, which does
not seem to be the case for occupational risks, causation will
tend to be exceedingly difficult to prove.2 3 Thus, even if a
child can prove negligence on the part of the mother's employ-
er, the necessity of showing that the maternal occupational
exposure actually caused the condition will often preclude tort
liability. Although physical causation for prenatal injury due to
parental exposure can be shown for many non-occupational
toxic torts,26 the lack of firm evidence linking maternal
2d 730, 731 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that workers' compensation was not the
sole remedy for a child born prematurely with severe birth defects as a result of the
mother's workplace accident during pregnancy), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 1281 (La.
1990); Adams v. Denny's Inc., 464 So. 2d 876, 878 (La. Ct. App.) (holding that a
tort claim for the wrongful death of an unborn child as a result of a fall by the
mother at work was not barred by the state workers' compensation scheme), writ
denied, 467 So. 2d 530 (La. 1985); Jarvis v. Providence Hosp., 444 N.W.2d 236, 238
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing a tort action for a fetus' death allegedly due to the
mother's contraction of hepatitis during her pregnancy because she cut her finger
while working in the employer's laboratory); State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Porter, 734
P.2d 729, 729 (Nev. 1987) (affirming the obligation of the Nevada workers' compen-
sation system to pay medical expenses attributable to an accident that caused the
premature delivery of the plaintiff's son after the mother was kicked by a horse on
the job); Pichon v. Opryland USA, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 326, 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that summary judgment for the employer was inappropriate in a case in
which a mother's employer required her to lift heavy objects during pregnancy, caus-
ing premature childbirth).
261. 602 F. Supp. 294, 295 (D. Kan. 1985) (involving a suit for damages for birth
defects suffered by the daughter of a woman exposed to lead in her employment at
defendant's battery manufacturing plant).
262. Id. at 296-97.
263. See REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 46, at 322-24 (discussing
the difficulties of proving causation in fetal tort injuries); GUIDELINES ON PREGNAN-
CY, supra note 49, at 3 (stating that although some factors relate to occupational
exposure and birth defects, most fetal damage is not ascribable to any known cause).
264. Scientists have clearly linked several specific types of toxins to maternal
prenatal exposure. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is one. The drug was given to pregnant
women in the United States to reduce the risk of miscarriage. Later it was shown
to have been the cause of a rare form of vaginal and cervical cancer in these
women's daughters. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 46, at 32. Thalido-
mide, a European prescription drug used to treat headaches, was another toxin
shown to cause major congenital malformations when pregnant women ingested the
drug during their pregnancies. Id. at 31. Other agents such as alcohol, tobacco, and
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occupational exposure to specific fetal injuries makes physical
causation difficult to prove." 5 Further, many allegations of
harm in real-world disputes caused by parental employment
involve paternal, not maternal, occupational exposure.26 As
this suggests, if employing future parents ever does lead to ex-
cessive tort liability, the problem cannot be solved simply by
excluding women, or pregnant women, from jobs involving
recognizable fetal hazards. Such harms can be the result of pa-
ternal as well as maternal exposure, 267 and can also result
from workplace conditions that are not unusually
hazardous.'
With respect to workers' own injuries, the problem of
crippling tort injuries has been handled by workers'
compensation schemes.2 9  These statutory schemes provide
compensation to workers injured on the job without regard to
fault,270 but are the sole basis of recovery to the exclusion of
tort claims for employment-related injuries.2 ' If crippling
tort liability does ever become a serious problem as a result of
parental employment, extending workers' compensation
schemes to specifically cover all reproductive injuries would be
one way to protect employers. 2
illegal drugs have been linked to fetal deformities. Id at 32.
265. GUIDELINES ON PREGNANCY, supra note 49 at 3.
266. Refer to note 50-52 infra.
267. Refer to notes 48-59 supra and accompanying text for a summary of the
scientific evidence on the adverse reproductive effects of paternal workplace exposure
to hazardous substances.
268. See, e.g., REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 46, at 105 (indicating
that occupational stress affects the reproductive system and may lead to infertility
in men and women).
269. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 1 (1992) (stating that state
workers' compensation schemes were designed to compensate workers for injuries
arising out of employment); ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS COM-
PENSATION: STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT 1 (1991) (explaining that state
workers' compensation schemes compensate employees for the economic consequences
of work-related injury, illness, and disease without regard to whether the employer
or employee is at fault). Every state has had a workers' compensation scheme. Id. at
16.
270. KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 169, at 1; see HERMAN M. SOMERS &
ANNE R. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: PREVENTION, INSURANCE, AND REHA-
BILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 26 (1954) (stating that workers' compensa-
tion schemes were designed to supplant the common law and were based entirely
upon a notion of liability without fault, or strict liability).
271. See 82 AM. Jun. 2D Workers' Compensation § 62 (1992) (stating that gener-
ally remedies under workers' compensation schemes are exclusive of all other com-
mon law remedies).
272. The general direction of workers' compensation has been to expand coverage
and benefits and to broaden definitions of compensable injury. Although a very broad
insurance program is possible, it will have high costs and demand higher premium
contributions from employers; on the other hand, higher premiums may be cheaper
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Perhaps someday there will be a basis for employers' fear
that crippling tort liability is more likely to arise as a result of
maternal employment than as a result of paternal
employment. This possibility could be true if fully-informed
women are, in fact, taking unreasonable risks because of an
overwhelming economic need that may push them into higher-
paying yet more hazardous jobs. Under such circumstances,
simply responding by using workers' compensation schemes to
bar tort recoveries might be inadequate.Y Even under these
circumstances, however, employers should not be able to decide
where and how to protect the next generation.27 4
Congress would be a better decisionmaker than
employers275 for a number of reasons. First, Congress would
have no direct financial stake in the issue, thus its decision on
whether to allow exclusionary fetal vulnerability policies would
be less likely to turn entirely on whether women were
marginal workers in the job in question. Second, although
members of Congress might share many of the problems
employers and courts have in regarding women's interests as
distinct from those of their children, they would be subject to
political pressure from women who can vote.27 6 Therefore,
than the cost of settling tort claims or paying tort judgments due to work-related
reproductive injury. See generally KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 269, at 16-18.
Case law is mixed on whether tort causes of action are available for injuries
sustained by workers' children or whether the sole remedy for children, as with
workers, is within the worker's compensation system. Compare Cushing v. Time
Saver Stores, Inc., 552 So. 2d 730, 731 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that state
workers' compensation scheme did not provide the sole remedy and that the child
born with birth defects due to a working mother's accident could bring a tort action)
with Bell v. Macys Cal., 261 Cal. Rptr. 447, 453 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the
state workers' compensation scheme is the child's exclusive remedy).
273. Refer to notes 277-89 infra and accompanying text for an outline of more
appropriate responses.
274. Refer to notes 144-51 supra and accompanying text.
275. Whether any regulatory agency currently has the authority to promulgate
sex-specific regulations is not clear. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has pub-
lished a regulation that discriminates on the basis of sex. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.1208
(1993) (regulating the occupational exposure of a pregnant woman to 0.5 rem of
neutron radiation during her entire pregnancy). The Environmental Protection Agen-
cy has issued a statement concerning the use of the pesticide TOK which warns
that it should not be used by women of childbearing age. See Jasso & Mazorra,
supra note 101, at 96 (citing EPA Reg. No. 707-92-AA, EPA Est. No. 477-MD-1,
TOK WP-50, Rohm & Haps).
If Title VII does ban all sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies, federal agen-
cies are acting illegally in promulgating sex-specific regulations affecting employment
opportunities. Congress has not, to date, authorized any agency to require or allow
employers to violate Title VII.
276. A recent example of the strong influence of women's groups in politics is
their role in the appointment of Janet Reno as Attorney General. Women's groups
were a relentless force bearing on President Clinton, insisting that a women be
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women's interests would not be ignored entirely. Third,
congressionally-mandated fetal vulnerability policies would not
necessarily shift the costs of fetal safety only to women and
their dependents. In the political arena, women could demand,
and might receive, some form of compensation for the costs
imposed on them when their employment opportunities are
limited for the safety of others.
If exclusion of all fertile women from some jobs proves to
be appropriate,"' direct or indirect compensation278 should
be given for the loss caused by that exclusion. 9 For ex-
ample, fertile women could be given a preference, similar to a
veterans' preference, for a comparable number of desirable jobs
elsewhere in the economy, such as jobs in government. Women
and their dependents are disproportionately poor, thus the cost
of protecting the health of unborn children should not be
placed entirely on a group in no position to bear itY
Without an offsetting preference for fertile women in other
jobs, we cannot be sure we are making children better off by
limiting their mothers' employment opportunities.28
Similarly, if exclusion of pregnant women proves
appropriate, some form of compensation, including medical
insurance coverage, would be necessary to compensate
pregnant workers for the work limits imposed on them at a
placed in the post. Dan Balz, Picking the Clinton Cabinet, WASH. POST MAG., May 9,
1993, at 26.
277. An alternative option, routine pregnancy testing, could be used to allow
fertile women to work at jobs involving exposure to chemicals rapidly eliminated
from the body. Not all chemicals are retained in the body for significant periods of
time. To eliminate carbon monoxide, for example, takes only four hours of normal
breathing. ROBERT E. GOSSELIN ET AL., CLINICAL TOxIcOLOGY OF COMMERCIAL
PRODUCTS 88 (1976). Vinyl Chloride is eliminated within 72 hours of exposure. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Ambient Water Quality Criteria for Vinyl Chloride,
EPA No. 44015-80-078, at C-14, C-15 (Oct. 1980). Benzene has a particularly short
half-life, somewhere between 0.4 to 1.6 hours. Id. at C-9, C-14. Carbon tetrachloride
only remains in the blood for 48 hours. Id. at C-23. Early detection of pregnancy is
now possible so that employers, through regular pregnancy testing, could minimize
the risk of fetal injury. Patrick T. Clendenen, International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.: Fetal Protection and Title VII Revisited, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 367, 395 n.135 (1991). However, pregnancy testing may implicate privacy ques-
tions. Becker, supra note 62, at 1234.
278. The term "compensation7 is used in a very broad sense to include any bene-
fit given to women excluded from jobs for the safety of their fetuses designed
roughly to offset the cost that exclusion imposes on them.
279. If Congress excludes women from jobs without compensating them, the legis-
lation might be unconstitutional under the Takings Clause of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
280. Refer to notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text.
281. Refer to notes 94-98 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
detrimental impact on working women and the children they support when an
employer's fetal protection policy eliminates or diminishes their jobs.
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time when they face high medical bills and increased living
expenses. 2 And something more than exclusion of pregnant
women is necessary to ensure fetal safety. Fetal safety will be
at risk because of pregnant women's exclusion from jobs, and
the consequent loss of income and benefits, unless excluded
workers receive income and medical insurance from an alterna-
tive source. 2M
Although Congress is unlikely to have the time or interest
necessary to regulate fetal hazards substance by substance, it
could delegate to an agency the power to promulgate reg-
ulations excluding fertile or pregnant women from certain jobs
if their employers met specified standards for the manner of
exclusion and the type and extent of compensation. Congress
could give the agency the authority to promulgate cross-
industry standards, protecting fetal safety whenever a certain
level of risk exists. If the costs of ensuring fetal safety in some
industries are much higher than in other industries with
regard to the same substance, the agency could instead
promulgate industry-specific standards. The agency could also
be responsible for compensating women for the costs associated
with exclusion in one of several alternative ways. For example,
the agency might require employers who exclude fertile women
from certain jobs to give women a preference, analogous to
veterans' preferences, for an equal number of other jobs with
equivalent pay and career potential, preferably in the same
locale. Or the agency itself could give women such options for
employment in either the private or the public sector.
Furthermore, if restrictions on the employment of pregnant
women are appropriate, Congress could direct the agency to
protect these especially vulnerable workers and their potential
children by ensuring that the women are not simply fired,
with consequent loss of both earnings and medical
282. Refer to notes 84-98 supra and accompanying text (summarizing the in-
creased needs of a woman during pregnancy). I do not suggest that a pregnant
worker and her child have no interests in common. The pregnant worker is likely to
be quite interested in fetal safety. However, she may have other interests, such as
supporting herself and her other children, paying her medical bills, and continuing
her career. Despite these interests, she might gladly limit her own opportunities for
the sake of her unborn child. But one cannot assume that externally imposed limits,
designed to protect the unborn child, are in her interest. Refer to notes 94-98 supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy problems in allowing employers
to implement fetal protection policies to the detriment of pregnant workers' other
interests.
283. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (M.D.
Ala. 1993) (noting that the plaintiff's child was born without the protection of medi-
cal insurance coverage because, after the plaintiff was fired because of her pregnan-
cy, she was unable to afford COBRA coverage and unable to obtain another policy).
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coverage.' 4 The agency could require that state workers'
compensation systems treat pregnancy as a disability and
provide both disability pay and medical coverage. The agency
could also require that employers give leaves to pregnant
workers for their periods of disability. Alternatively, the agency
could require employers to transfer pregnant women facing
specified fetal hazards to other jobs during pregnancy, with no
loss of pay or seniority and with the right to return to their
former jobs after childbirth.
Congress could also protect fetal safety by directly
authorizing employers by statute to exclude workers on the
basis of fetal hazards, provided that they meet specified job
exclusion and compensation standards. For example, an
individual employer could exclude fertile or pregnant women if
it could show the level of differential vulnerability by sex
required by the statute and if it also compensated the excluded
women according to the statutory standard, perhaps in some of
the ways suggested above. Like Title VII, such a scheme could
be enforced by the EEOC and private litigantsY
5
By enacting or authorizing fetal vulnerability policies such
as those described above, Congress could protect fetal health
without turning the difference between the risks associated
with maternal and paternal employment into an advantage for
men and a disadvantage for womenY To the extent that
compensation is effective, the costs of fetal safety would not be
borne entirely by women and their dependents, as is the case
284. Johnson Controls indicates that Title VII and specifically the PDA accom-
plish this minimal goal. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991) (holding that an employer's fetal protection policy excluding
fertile women from lead exposure jobs violated the PDA); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial
Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1554 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that discharge of plaintiff, a
pregnant X-ray technician, was not a business necessity absent exploration of less
discriminatory alternatives and was a violation of Title VII). I propose that Congress
could amend the ADA or the FMLA to provide greater options and more protection
for accommodating the needs of pregnant workers. Refer to notes 244-53 supra and
accompanying text.
285. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (delegating to the EEOC
the power to enforce Title VII when a complaint is filed with the Commission by
acting in its own action against the employer or by allowing the aggrieved private
citizen to file civil suit against her employer).
286. As Catharine MacKinnon has noted, discrimination rationally designed to
promote fetal safety is often unjust, because it turns a difference between men and
women into an advantage for men and a disadvantage for women and thereby sup-
ports "a system of second-class status for half of humanity." SEXuAL HARASSMENT,
supra note 111, at 105; refer to notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the circumstances under which fetal protection policies arise, typically in
blue collar, traditionally male workforce situations and not in workplaces with pri-
marily female, non-union, low paid employees.
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today with sex-specific policies instituted by employers. 287
Unfortunately, federal regulation would be costly and
perhaps ineffective. At both the agency and congressional
levels, various interest groups might try to use the regulatory
system to achieve purposes other than those described here. It
might be difficult for Congress to ensure effective regulation in
terms of either preventing the unreasonable exclusion of
women or adequately compensating them.'
Given the problems and costs associated with
regulation-including the possibility of congressional
insensitivity to women's independent interests-regulation
should be considered only if there is firm evidence that sig-
nificant numbers of children are likely to be born with birth
defects as a result of maternal occupational exposure. In the
immediate future, employers should handle the problem of
fetal vulnerability due to parental occupational exposure by
following two simple rules. First, employers should fully
disclose reproductive risks to working women and men. Sec-
ond, employers should not discriminate in employment on the
basis of pregnancy or potential pregnancy. If an employer
desired to allow employees the option of avoiding reproductive
hazards during vulnerable times, then it could offer prospective
parents temporary transfers or work reassignments. 
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that both sound policy and anti-
discrimination doctrine dictate the result in Johnson Controls:
employers cannot exclude fertile women from jobs potentially
hazardous to the well-being of their unconceived and unborn
children. Similarly, both sound policy and doctrine should
287. Refer to notes 94-98 supra and accompanying text (describing the adverse
effects of sex-specific exclusionary fetal protection policies on female workers and
their families).
288. These difficulties might be lessened if the regulations helped employers, even
if by way of unintended effects. OSHA, for example, enjoys support because its regu-
lations have achieved unintended effects benefiting some employers. See Ann P.
Bartel & Lacy G. Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at
OSHA's Impact, 28 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25 (1985) (suggesting that interest groups sup-
port OSHA because it effectively, though indirectly, transfers wealth to large union-
ized firms).
289. Refer to notes 175-85 supra and accompanying text. This section of the Arti-
cle discusses the ability of employers to offer work options, with two caveats. They
may not discriminate against pregnancy and related conditions, nor may they offer
work options only to women if scientific evidence suggests that men too are faced
with a reproductive hazard and require equal access to job alternatives. Refer to
notes 48-59 supra and accompanying text.
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forbid employer policies limiting the work opportunities of
pregnant women. These results should not, however, absolve
employers of the responsibility for providing a reasonably safe
workplace. And employers should be free, under Title VII and
current caselaw, to offer pregnant women or workers who are
prospective parents and thus especially at risk, job options not
generally available to workers, such as temporary transfers to
low-risk areas.
Johnson Controls does not answer all the needs of
employers and employees in this controversial area. For
employees, there is still the need for some sort of rule, either
a new interpretation of Title VII or an amendment to the
ADA, requiring employers to accommodate the needs of future
parents during pregnancy or while they are trying to conceive,
at least when reasonable accommodation is economically
feasible. In addition, employees need far better information
about reproductive risks in their workplaces. For employers,
there may some day-if significant tort liability does ever
become a serious problem-be a need to avoid catastrophic
liability, whether resulting from maternal or paternal
occupational exposure, perhaps by expanding the workers'
compensation system to include fetal injury due to parental
workplace exposure.
If scientific evidence reveals that some risks are higher for
fertile or pregnant women holding hazardous jobs than for
men, and that too many women are taking too many risks,
then further changes will be needed. But employers will still
not be the appropriate decisionmakers for designing fair fetal
protection policies. Congress-or more likely some federal
agency empowered by Congress-would be a better
decisionmaker because federal rules would cross industry lines.
Women and children could then be protected with respect to
low-paying women's jobs as well as high-paying men's jobs. In
addition, the regulator could be empowered to offer the women
whose opportunities are so limited preferences in some other
employment, since we cannot otherwise be sure that we are, in
fact, acting in the interest of the next generation.
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